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SUMMARY
A QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS MODEL FOR PRIVATE SECURITY
MANAGERS
by
GABRIëL JACOBUS LE ROUX
DEGREE: DOCTOR  OF  LITERATURE AND PHILOSOPHY
in the subject
POLICE SCIENCE
PROMOTER: PROF C W MARAIS
An easy-to-use quantitative risk analysis model is developed for the private security industry
in South Africa, which can be used as a suitable analysing tool in the hands of the private
security manager.
This model incorporate different concepts such as the probability, impact, cost of risk, degree
of correction and the newly established human factor concept, which cannot be seen in
isolation.  This latter concept plays a major part in the overall risk quantification process in
establishing a most accurate risk score rating.
The human factor concept, also known as  the “CHHP” approach, is the first concept, which
will round the model of in an effective measuring way.  Human factors such as (i) control
measures  (ii) human attitude towards the risk (iii) handling of the risk and (iv) understanding
and implementation of policies and procedures are combined to form part of the total
integrated quantitative risk analysis model, also known as the “TIQCAM”-model.
The “TIQCAM”-model  uses Excel spreadsheet format as the principal means to illustrate the
total integration of all risk concepts and also providing the user of the model with a solid
foundation in analyze physical and quantifiable security risks. This model will also enable the
user to use it as a value-added service to their clients.
vKeywords:
Quantitative; Analysis; Risk; Modelling; Management; Private security; Managers,
Mathematics; Concepts; Risk classification.
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OPSOMMING
A QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS MODEL FOR PRIVATE SECURITY
MANAGERS
deur
GABRIëL JACOBUS LE ROUX
GRAAD: DOCTOR LITERATURE AND PHILOSOPHY
In die
POLISIE WETENSKAP
PROMOTOR : PROF C W MARAIS
‘n Gebruikers-vriendelike kwantitatiewe risiko analise model is ontwerp vir die Suid-
Afrikaanse privaat sekuriteitsbedryf , wat die sekuriteitsbestuurder met gemak kan gebruik
vir analise doeleindes.
Hierdie model inkorporeer verskillende konsepte soos die waarskynlikheid, impak, risiko
koste, graad van korreksie en die nuwe menslikheidsfaktor konsep, wat nie in isolasie beskou
kan word nie.  Laasgenoemde konsep speel ‘n fundamentele rol in die algehele kwantitatiewe
risiko analise proses wanneer gepoog word om die mees akurate risiko te bepaal.
Die menslikheidsfaktor konsep, ook bekend as die “CHHP”-benadering, is die eerste konsep
wat die model sal afrond tot ‘n effektiewe maatstaf.  Menslike faktore soos (i) kontrole
maatreëls (ii) menslike ingesteldheid tot risiko (iii) hantering van risiko en (iv) insig in en
implementasie van beleide en prosedures word gekombineer om deel te vorm van die totale
geïntegreerde kwantitatiewe risiko analise model, ook bekend as die “TIQCAM”-model.
Die “TIQCAM”-model maak gebruik van ‘n Excel werkboek formaat om die totale integrasie
van alle risiko konsepte te vertoon en voorsien die gebruiker ook van ‘n vaste grondslag vir
die analise van fisiese en kwantifiseerbare risikos. Hierdie model sal ook die gebruiker in
staat stel om ‘n toegevoegde waarde diens aan kliënte te bied.
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11 CHAPTER 1
GENERAL ORIENTATION
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Businesses have been using mathematical1 tools to help solve problems for thousands
of years. The formal study and applicability of quantitative techniques to practical
decision making is, however, largely a product of the twentieth century. The
techniques in this study can be applied successfully to an increasingly wide variety of
complex problems in business, government, education, security and safety, and many
other areas.
It isn’t enough, though, just to know the mathematics of how a particular quantitative
technique works; you must also be familiar with the limitations, assumptions, and
specific applicability of the technique. The successful use of quantitative techniques
usually results in a solution that is timely, accurate, flexible, economical, reliable, and
easy to understand and use.
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT
The researcher has, in the course of his research for his Master’s Degree with regard
to the “Posisionering van Risikobestuur binne Naspers” came to the conclusion that
managers neither possess the knowledge nor the skills needed for risk management
(Le Roux 2000: 187). This results in a lack of necessary care and seriousness when
approaching the risk situation. Taking this into consideration, the primary problem
with private security managers seems to be the ignorance with regard to the nature,
extent, as well as content of risk management, and more specifically the analysing
thereof.
An analysis of the primary problem indicates the following secondary problems:
                                                
1 Mathematical model is a set of mathematical relationships that represent, or approximate, a real situation
(Wayne & Albright 1997:4).
2· The first secondary problem appears to be the lack of an effective quantitative risk
analysis model for private security managers, which can be used successfully to
identify and control risks within the organizational environment.
· The next secondary problem is the need for security managers to know how to use
a suitable quantitative risk analysis model, thereby bringing about an effective
analysis of the physical risk facing companies where security service is rendered.
Except for the secondary problems, it is found that a quantitative decision-making
model exists on short-term crime prevention measures (Roelofse 2001:i). Although
this model integrates some of the concepts, it does not employ any human factors,
which is one of the important concepts in the researcher’s “TIQCAM” model.
Roelofse (2001:26) further states that the decision-making model forms the crux of
his thesis. Researcher’s model is directed towards the security industry to supply them
with a software tool in measuring risk and to set a risk classification of high, medium
or low, which can then be taken in consideration during the decision-making process.
 Research as opposed to inquiries are also done at international level, which indicate
that a quantitative risk analysis model does not exist for the security manager (see
schedules B and C). Inquiries done at Security Industry Regulatory Authority (SIRA)
also indicate that no training material or other literature exist in quantitative risk
analysis for security managers.
This motivated the researcher to develop a suitable model for the private security
industry in South Africa.
It must be stated that the researcher design his own model, which was called
“FAMASER” (Facility Management Services)2. By testing this model it was found by
the delegates (selected group of security managers), that it is problematic in the sense
                                                                                                                                                       
2 See point 1.5.3.4(Pre-testing of quantitative risk analysis model).
3that the model is too complicated to use. An Easy-To-Use Model is suggested which
leads to this research in developing a convenient model.
Having thus stated the problem, the objective of the research will now be formulated.
1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE
The objective of the research is formulated as a result of stating the problem, and
therefore provides the angle from which the research is done. The objective of the
research is to provide the South African private security managers with guidelines in
using a quantitative risk analysis model.
This objective includes the following:
· To determine the exact need within the private security industry in developing a
quantitative risk analysis model.
· To carry out a theoretical investigation with regard to quantitative risk analysis
models on a national level in order to ascertain what its didactic-scientific
foundation should be.
· To establish guidelines for the development of a risk analysis model for private
security managers for not only analysing risk in their own environment, but also
use it as a value-added service to their clients. In the process, attention should be
given to the structuring of a physical risk analysis model to ensure the meaningful
implementation thereof.
· The objective is also to supply security managers with the essential skills and
knowledge they need to make their own decisions with regard to the seriousness
of physical risks when using the quantitative risk analysis model.
It should be mentioned that since training methods in a business context are normally
coordinated by human resources, it becomes the responsibility of the organization’s
4management to care for the development of human resources, meaning staff as well as
managers in a wide variety of fields, such as transport, marketing, health and safety
and many other areas. The total spectrum of risk management is a specialised field of
expertise and would therefore not be typified as a human resources function. The
development of a quantitative model in risk analysis (a risk management function) can
inevitably also involve the human resources trainers, who, in turn, can train managers
in the their different areas.
Although the model can be a helpful tool for training purposes, the main contribution
by the researcher in this study is to utilise a mathematical configuration (natural/pure
science) to create a basic social science model.
1.4 RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS
The following hypotheses are formulated with the eye on the subject and against the
background of the foresaid research objectives and goals.
The researcher believes that:
Hypothesis 1 - No practical quantitative risk analysis model exists in South Africa’s
private security companies
Hypothesis 2- The private security managers are unskilled in quantitative risk
analysis
After researching the abovementioned hypotheses, the researcher will conclude that
no quantitative risk analysis model exists for the private security industry and that the
security manager is in fact unskilled in the use thereof. It must be noted that the
concentration will therefore be solely on the development of a physical3 quantitative
risk analysis model for the private security manager.
                                                
3 See discussion under point 1.5.1.2, the last paragraph, for more insight regarding the physical aspect
51.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The following aspects will be dealt with, which is of vital importance for this study:
1.5.1 Demarcation
1.5.1.1 Spatial
The research involved fifty (50) security managers from seven (7)
different security companies on a national basis in the Republic of
South Africa. Two regions were selected for this research project,
namely the Western Cape and Gauteng. The reason for this is that the
seven selected security companies are mostly situated and operative
in both these regions.
Two groups of managers were also present, namely: (i) security
managers, and (ii) risk practitioners. Referring to the last group it is
found that some security companies have their own perception of the
term “Risk Practitioners” or “Risk Manager”. For those companies
the foresaid terms still refer to the security manager. The reason for
this is that the risk practitioner and/or risk manager is also
responsible for the total spectrum of physical security.  For the
purpose of this research project, the researcher will mostly use the
term “Security Manager”.
Researcher must highlight the point that although the three-step
career part of management (See table 2.1) establishes the steps as (i)
junior management (ii) middle management and (iii) senior
management, the focus was between middle and senior management.
For the purpose of this study, where the fifty (50) security managers
were involved as the research group, the researcher shall only abide
6by the term “Security Managers” whether they are junior, middle or
senior management.
1.5.1.2 Concept demarcation
In doing a risk analysis, all the different risk analysis concepts are
taken into consideration.  These concepts have their own criteria,
indicator and risk rating, which is important in the analysing process
to come to a positive result regarding the risk problem.
These concepts are illustrated in the following steps:
· Step 1: Probability
· Step 2: Impact
· Step 3: Cost factor
· Step 4: Degree of Correction
· Step 5: Human Factor.
After all the steps are taken into consideration, it will then reflect the
risk subtotal and the risk total where after a risk classification will be
established. This classification plays a fundamental role in the whole
analysing process because it will then determine if future action is
needed. This also means that the future action must then be taken into
consideration for decision-making purposes in solving the risk
problem. The future action is illustrated with a red connection to
place the emphasis on the importance of solving the risk problem
(see figure 1.1 under 1.6.3).
Furthermore the researcher will only use two physical risk problems,
namely robbery and fraud, as an example to establish the end result
of that spesific risk problem by using the different concepts as
mentioned. Hypothetical ratings will be assigned to the two above
mentioned risk problems in order to come to a final risk
7classification. This will give the reader a better insight in how to use
the model in a practical way.
1.5.1.3 Quantitative and qualitative approaches
A brief explanation to elucidate the difference between qualitative
and quantitative research is necessary to ensure that the reader
understand the terms and is able to bring in into context with this
research study.
Babbie (1992:372) describes qualitative data as non-numerical data
and quantitative data as numerical data. He further differentiates
between these terms as follows:
(i) Quantitative research - quantification ensures that obser-
vations are more explicit and therefore makes it easier to
accumulate and summarise data (statistical analysis) i.e.
collecting data in the form of numbers.
(ii) Qualitative research - qualitative data is richer in meaning,
although the qualitative researcher has less control mech-
anisms. This means that the researcher will be more involved
with observation and fieldwork i.e. data collected in the form
of words or pictures (Neser, Joubert & Sonnekus, 1995:182).
(iii) Triangulation as a combination of the quantitative and
qualitative approaches
After a preliminary literature study in 2001, the researcher
started his research in 2002, and decided to utilize a
combination of the quantitative and qualitative approaches,
which is called the triangulation approach. An information
schedule is used in order to establish the need for a
8quantitative risk analysis model for private security managers
(see sample information schedule as schedule “A” and
discussion under 1.5.3.3).
The reason why researcher chose the triangulation approach
for this study, is that it enables deeper understanding of this
research, by combining the methods.
De Vos (2002:342) advocates that there are several types of
triangulation of which triangulation of methods means mixing
quantitative and qualitative styles of research and data. This
study is carried out by using two methods in parallel, or both
simultaneously.
Patten (2002:247) places the emphasis strongly on the use of
the triangulation approach by stating that combining methods
also strengthens a study. This can mean using several kinds of
methods or data, including using both quantitative and
qualitative approaches.
According to Healy and Perry (in Golafshani 2003:603) argue
the involvement of triangulation of several data sources and
their interpretations with those multiple perceptions in the
realism paradigm. Some scholars at the University of British
Columbia, Canada, also argue that quantitative and qualitative
approaches should not be triangulated. They believe that
using mixed methods is method slurring and consider it to be
sloppy research (Hilton 2002:3).
Researcher is of the opinion that any individual is entitled to
his own perception, however the researcher’s perception is
that using the triangulation approach in this study, can only
provide confirmation and completeness. De Vos (2002:242)
9adds that it also allows researchers to be more confident of
their results.
1.5.2 Research techniques
The research methodology can be described as:
· Descriptive
· Interpretive
· Application
(i) Descriptive
Research has various shapes and sizes and it is therefore necessary that
the researcher decides on the type of research that he intends doing,
prior to the start of his study (Neuman, 1997:18).
This study is focussed on the researcher’s contribution to the science of
policing (security) and therefore it is imperative for the researcher to
pursue levels of descriptive, interpretation and application.
It is also important to differentiate between the different types of
studies (Mouton & Marais, 1991:42) and to indicate which study or
combination of studies will be applicable to this research study.
The three types of studies are:
· Exploratory Studies - The goal of exploratory studies is the
exploration of something new or about a relatively unknown area
(Mouton & Marais, 1991:43) of which the investigator has little or
no knowledge about. Neuman (1997:19) explains this type of study
as a relatively new topic or issue in which the researcher tends to
address the “what” question.
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· Descriptive Studies - Descriptive studies are more specific with its
main aim to observe and report on events or actions. According to
Neuman (1997:20) this type of study represents a great deal of
social research and focus on the “who” and “how” questions. The
researcher therefore conducts his/her research to describe the
subject and to provide a detailed picture thereof.
· Explanatory Studies - The aim of explanatory studies is to explain
a given phenomena in terms of specific causes (Marais & Mouton,
1991:45) i.e. the desire to know “why” (Neuman, 1997:20).
Taking the abovementioned descriptive discussion in perspective, it
should describe any situation or area of interest, factually and accu-
rately.
(ii) Interpretive
The researcher’s view of “interpretive” is that data is gathered (See
point 1.5.3.1) that generates “thick” description and interpretation that
allows theory building. This study will include the researcher’s
interpretation of the quantitative risk analysis model for the private
security manager.
(iii) Application
Although an investigation of this nature will inevitably lean towards
the philosophical, and even the normative, an effort will be made to
concentrate more on the practical application, in that the researcher’s
own experience in risk management will be used to supplement the
manuscript study. Informal conversations with fellow researchers,
trainers and academics at universities and technikons will similarly
serve to support and confirm the researcher’s experiences and
opinions.
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The abovementioned discussion is also applicable when collecting data
for this research project (See point 1.5.3.1).
1.5.3 Research procedure
1.5.3.1 Data Collection
Fundamental to this research is data collection. It refers to the survey
methods that will be developed and utilized to obtain information.
The methods utilized relevant to this project are literature studies
whereby the researcher will utilize journals, books, Government
documents, policy reports, presented papers and the internet. This
method is of an empirical nature because mathematics (numbers)
forms part of this study.
Glazer (2001: 1) defines empirical study as study that includes a brief
review of the literature, a research question or hypothesis, hard
(numbers) data from a group of participants in a study, a statistical
result section, and discussion section of the results.
It must be stated that the researcher’s own experience of risk
management, National Key Points and big companies, who are
investing a lot in security measures in protecting their personnel,
assets and properties, will also be used to supplement this study (see
last paragraph under point 1.5.2 – (iii) application).
1.5.3.2 Sampling
According to Du Plooy (2001:16) the following sampling techniques
exist:
· Probability samples
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- Simple random sample
- Stratified random sample
· Quasi-probability samples
- Systematic random sample
- Cluster random sample
- Multi stage random sample
· Non-probability samples
- Convenience sample (Sometimes called accident, available or 
opportunity sample)
- Purposive sample (Known-group/judgement or quota sample)
- Volunteer sample
- Snowball sample
The researcher selects his own sampling technique and respondents,
which is based on the “purposive sampling technique”. According to
Huysamen (1994:44) this is the most important kind of non-probability
sampling. Researchers rely on their experience, ingenuity and/or
previous research findings to deliberately obtain participants in such a
manner that the sample obtained may be regarded as representative of
the relevant population.
In order to establish the size of the research group the viewpoint is that
it should be proportional representative of the universum. The
perception also exists that it is not the size of the research group that
determine the reliability, but rather if the research group is
representative of the universum (Van Vuuren, 1992:9).
Researcher also agrees with Van Vuuren (1992:9) that no guarantee
can be given that the representative group are in all respects
representative of the whole security community or that the results will
stay unchanged unless the security community is involved with this
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investigation. It can well be said that the representative group is
probably accurately representative.
The universum and/or population sample of the researcher consist of
the security community in South Africa, which consists of 4,256
security companies (See table 2.2- registered security providers per
region). The researcher decides on the top 20 security companies as his
research group to be representative of the universum (See Table 1.1).
Table 1.1: Top 20 ranking service providers
Ranking Service Provider Employees Industry %
1 FIDELITY SECURITY SERVICES 18,445 8.43%
2 SECURICOR GRAY SECURITY SERVICES 9,263 4.24%
3 CALLGUARD & SUBSIDIARIES 8,295 3.79%
4 MAGNUM SHIELD SECURITY 6,853 3.13%
5 CHUBB & SUPERGROUP BBR 6,691 3.06%
6 COIN SECURITY GROUP 4,250 1.94%
7 ADT& SENTRY 4,110 1.88%
8 SECURECO (PTY) LTD 3,791 1.73%
9 ENFORCE GUARDING (PTY) LTD 2,698 1.23%
10 COMMAND SECURITY SERVICES 2,206 1.01%
11 MAXI SECURITY 2000 (PTY) LTD 1,951 0.89%
12 PROTEA SECURITY SERVICES 1,663 0.76%
13 GREMICK- A DIVISION OF SERVEST 1,613 0.74%
14 STALLION SECURITY (PTY) LTD 1,502 0.69%
15 DE BRUIN SECURITY CC 1,315 0.60%
16 GONDO SECURITY SERVICES 1,234 0.56%
17 PEACEFORCE SECURITY CC 1,163 0.53%
18 BHEJANE SECURITY CONSULTANTS 1,125 0.51%
19 HLANGANANI PROTECTION SERVICES 1,120 0.51%
20 LODGE SERVICES (PTY) LTD 1,080 0.49%
Source: Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority
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The researcher puts all the names of the top 20 security companies in
a hat and drew four names, which now form part of this research
project (See table 1.2).
Table 1.2: Informal survey for the need of developing a
quantitative risk analysis model for security
managers
Security Providers % Need of % Not in
need of
NASAP (National Strategic Asset Protection) 100% 0%
ASAP (Atlantis Security Asset Protection) 92% 8%
Group 4 Security Services 83% 17%
Company A (Listing top 20 company) 100% 0%
Company B (Listing top 20 company) 75% 25%
Company C (Listing top 20 company) 83% 17%
Company D (Listing top 20 company) 92% 8%
Source:  Own compilation
From this universum three (3) other security companies were also
identified. The representative group as per figure 1.2 are in total
seven (7) security companies, thus the sample representing the
security community.
It must be clearly stated, that no reference was made regarding
Companies A – D (see table 1.2), due to a request that their business
and interviewers identity must be handled strictly confidential.
1.5.3.3 Information Schedule
Groenewald (1988:44) states that research interviews are a
conversation with the aim to obtain information. This conversation
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can range from an informal or unstructured to a formal or structured
interview and can take place with or without an accompanying
questionnaire.  Bailey (1987:106) is of the opinion that an instrument
that is not given directly to the respondent but is filled in by an
interviewer who reads the questions to the respondent is generally
called an interview schedule.
The researcher made use of an information schedule, which gave rise
to individual interviews with security managers in seven different
private security companies, four of which are listed as the top 20
security companies in South Africa (See Table 1.1). Affirmative
notes of the interviews are available with the researcher on demand
considering the identity of persons involved has been handled as
strictly confidential.
The information schedule that is used contains 12 main questions
with 50 sub-questions. The purpose of this schedule is to gather
information to establish the need for developing a quantitative risk
analysis model for security managers in South Africa.
The researcher selected negative answers from the information
schedule by marking them with a red symbol called asterisk, which
indicates that the more negative answers is marked, the more
companies are in need of a quantitative risk analysis model.
The two main leading questions asked in the information schedule
(see schedule “A”) leads to the formation of statistics (See Table 1.1)
in discovering the need for the development of a quantitative risk
analysis model for private security managers. The following two
questions were taken into consideration when formulating the needs
survey.
· How is risk analysis defined in your organization?
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· To what degree is risk analysis, accepted by management?
The calculations in the information schedule were solely worked on
the negative rating. The amount of scores achieved as a negative
answer is divided by the 12 questions (See information schedule A)
and then multiplied it by 100 to change it to percentage. The higher
the negative percentage the more the companies are in need of a
quantitative risk analysis model (See table 1.3 for calculations)
Table 1.3: Calculations according to information schedule
Security providers Negative
calculation
%
Nasap (National Strategic Asset Protection) 12 / 12 x 100 100
Asap (Atlantis Security Asset Protection) 11 / 12 x 100 92
Group 4 Security Services 10 / 12 x 100 83
Company A (One of Top 20) 12 / 12 x 100 100
Company B (One of Top 20) 9 / 12 x 100 75
Company C (One of Top 20) 10 / 12 x 100 83
Company D (One of Top 20) 11 / 12 x 100 92
Source: Own compilation
According to the percentage not in need of a quantitative risk
analysis model to be developed, it is not that the respondents are
negative in this regard, but they rather do not perceive it as
necessary, due to the fact that they are physical security providers
and not risk analysts.
It is also important to establish whether the abovementioned
instrument (information schedule) is trustworthy and accurate, which
must be taken in consideration when measuring the validity and
reliability of  measurement.
According to Bailey (1987:66) the definition of validity has to parts:
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(1) that the measuring instrument is actually measuring the concept
in question, and not some other concept; and (2) that the concept is
being measured accurately.  Both Van Vuuren (1992:14) and
Groenewald (1988:30) agree but the latter is of the opinion that
validity should also be transformed to the ability of the researcher in
carrying out the process of measuring in a consequent manner.
The validity of the researcher’s information schedule is tested on the
hand of personal interviews (see Appendix A) as well as a
presentation to various security managers (see pre-testing under point
1.5.3.4).  The test can therefore be viewed as reasonably trustworthy
and reliable, because it happens to test what should be tested,
namely, the importance of relevant questions, the way in which the
questions are asked and understood.
Concerning the reliability, it must also measure what it is supposed to
measure (Van Vuuren 1992:15-16). Although the two essential
measuring instruments, the Alpha and Cronbach coëffisiënt, ensure
the most reliable and accurate outcome according to Bohrnstedt in
Van Vuuren (1992:15-16), the researcher is of the opinion that the
validity and reliability in his measuring process is accurate and
ensure not only consistency, but that the respondents are convinced
that all the questions in the information schedule are relevant to the
stated goals of this study.
1.5.3.4 Pre-testing of quantitative risk analysis model
Pre-testing is the final stage in questionnaire construction and one of
the most important (Bailey 1987:141). The sample for a pre-test is
usually some “captive audience” such as office staff, co-workers,
fellow students or family (Bailey 1987:141).
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The researcher also pre-tested the quantitative risk model, by using
Excel spreadsheets, which were developed and a presentation in this
regard was held in Cape Town. Various security managers and risk
practitioners attended this presentation. Two types of quantitative
risk analysis models were presented.
The first model, called “FAMASER" analysis model”4 contains all
the aspects that are necessary to come to a conclusion in taking a
decision in handling risks. The aspects include the probability,
impact (severity and sensitivity), cost factor, and degree of correction
and researcher’s own viewpoint on human factors. The human
factors mainly looks at personnel skills, their attitude to the risk,
procedure in handling risk and the emergency aspects regarding their
knowledge of the total emergency situation. The conference
delegates accepted this quantitative model but the perception is that
intensive training should be given, not only to security managers, but
also their deputies. With an in-depth discussion whether this model is
suitable for security supervisors, all the delegates were of the opinion
that they would find it difficult in using the model unless intensive
training on the whole aspect of quantitative analysis is given.
A second quantitative risk analysis model was developed solely for
the purpose of a more user friendly model for security supervisors,
which the delegates received with open arms and their views are that
this model is even suitable for use by security managers. This easy-
to-use model is only based on human factor questions in a risk
situation, which plays a fundamental role in quantifying risks. The
following questions are applicable:
· The possibility that a risk might occur;
· The history;
· Circumstances;
                                                
4 See discussion in Chapter 1 under point 1.2
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· Human factors (skills, attitude etc.);
· Handling of the risk;
· Company procedures regarding the risk.
Although the delegates were impressed and satisfied with both
models and view this as a breakthrough for the security managers, it
is the perception of researcher that it only gives an indication of the
risk rating, whether it is a high, medium or a low risk. It is not really
reliable in the sense that no probability or impact factors were
considered. This model is taken as the basis where upon the
“TIQCAM” model (Total Integrated Quantitative Concept Analysis
Model) is developed (See point 1.6.3).
1.6 CONCEPT CLARIFICATION
The following essential terms, which are representative in this study, will briefly be
discussed thus providing a better insight and understanding for the reader. Other less
important terms that might be applicable are defined in chapter 2 under point 2.2.
Also considering the fact that many authors have different views of the terms that’s
been defined, the researcher is going to abide by the author’s definitions as
mentioned.
1.6.1 Risk
Risk is associated with virtually every activity one can think of, but according
to Ozier (2003a: 5) risk is defined as the chance or likelihood of an undesirable
event occurring and causing harm or loss. The key element of risk here is
uncertainty, without which there is no “risk”.
For the purpose of this study, researcher shall limit the meaning of the word
“risk” to the uncertainty of financial loss, the variations between actual and
expected results, or the probability that a loss can occur or will occur. This
means that quantitative concepts, such as probability, impact (involving
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sensitivity or severity), cost factor, degree of correction and human factors,
play a fundamental role in any risk situation and in the establishment of risk
classifications, whether it is high, medium or low.
Risk quantification and using concepts are fundamental to the main business of
any organisation. Risks in business context is normally of a physical nature
and is seen as non-speculative that have no potential for showing profit
(Valsamakis, Vivian & Du Toit 2000:36).
Broder (2000:5) also places a high priority on the so-called physical risks in
business. The following events or kinds of risk are the most commonly
concerned:
· Natural catastrophe (tornado, hurricane, seismic activity);
· Industrial disaster (explosion, chemical spill, structural collapse, fire);
· Civil disturbance (sabotage, labour violence, bomb threats);
· Criminality (robbery, burglary, pilferage, embezzlement, fraud, internal
theft, hijacking);
· Conflicts of interest (kickbacks, trading on inside information, commercial
bribery, other unethical business practices).
All the risks in both of these categories are likely to need particular, individual
attention when analyzing the overall “riskiness”.  A decision must be made
about which risks are amenable to more detailed evaluation and quantification
(Martin & Tate 2002:4).
Researcher is of the opinion that the security science can play a more
prominent role in assisting the business community in quantifying their
physical risk.
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1.6.2 Risk Analysis
According to Shimonski (2002:2) risk analysis is also known as risk
assessment and is becoming more and more untenable in terms of usability,
flexibility, and critically in terms of what they produce for the user.  Ozier
(2003a:5) disagrees with Shimonski on the fact that risk analysis and risk
assessment are one concept. According to Ozier (2003a:5) it is totally two
different concepts and must be handled accordingly. The latter author’s
version of risk analysis is the process of gathering and analysing risk-related
information in the preparation of a risk assessment.  Risk assessment is a
rather detailed articulation of the risks associated with the information assets
and supporting resources at risk, threats that could adversely impact those
assets, and vulnerabilities that could allow those threats to occur with greater
frequency or impact (Ozier 2003a:5).
Broder (2000:2) is of the opinion that risk analysis is a management tool, the
standards for which are determined by whatever management decides it wants
to accept in terms of actual loss. Valsamakis, Vivian and Du Toit (2000:26)
refer to risk evaluation as the analysis of loss exposure, where attention is
focused on how frequent and how severe accidents are likely to be and how
they may interfere with the organization’s success. In other words, risk
analysis entails quantifying the risk and determining its possible impact on an
organization. With this in mind quantitative analysis can therefore be defined
as the scientific approach using quantitative techniques as a tool in decision-
making. A briefer discussion on what quantitative risk analysis implies will
follow in chapter 2 under point 2.2.6.
To promote unity of thought, “Risk Analysis” instead of “ Risk Assessment”
will be used throughout this study.
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1.6.3 Model
Although there are many views about the definition of the term model such as
the representation of reality or real life situation, the perspective of Koller
(2000:6) is that the model be a spreadsheet that has taken the leap from being a
data organizer to an analysis tool.  A model thus represents a process with
combinations of data, formulas and functions. By adding cells that help you
better understand and analyse your data, your data spreadsheet becomes a
spreadsheet model.
For the researcher the focus in this study would be on a mathematical model.
This means a model following a quantitative approach by using mathematical
equations and concepts to represent the relationship within the model. These
concepts, namely: probability, impact, cost factor, degree of correction and the
human factor (See chapters 3 to 7) will then be integrated in establishing the
full potential of the model by accurately setting the risk classification, which
are solely based on physical (crime-related) risks. The researcher’s model will
be a spreadsheet that will take the leap as an analysis tool, which will then be
called the “TIQCAM” model as illustrated in figure 1.1.
The model is a flow chart process, integrating all the quantitative concepts that
will be made applicable in the developing of the model.
The “TIQCAM” model starts off with a risk problem, which will lead to the
commencement of a quantitative risk analysis. In doing a risk analysis, the
analyst should take all the different concepts into consideration. These
concepts have their own criteria, which are important in the analysis  process
to come to a positive result regarding the risk problem.
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Figure 1.1: Total integrated quantitative concept approach model
Source:  Own compilation
1.6.4 Mathematics
According to authors Levey and Greenhall (1985:1094) mathematics is a
deductive study of numbers, geometry and various abstract constructs.
Mathematics is very broadly divided into foundation, algebra, analysis,
geometry and applied mathematics. The term “applied mathematics” loosely
designates a wide range of studies with significant current use in the empirical
science. It includes computer science, mathematical physics, probability theory
and mathematical statistics.
Reksnes (2003: 4) is also of the opinion that the terms “mathematics” and
“quantitative” represent the same purpose.  Both deal with numbers, functions,
and the sequence theories. A brief discussion on the latter aspects follows:
Risk problem
Quantitative
risk
analysis
Concept application
Step 1: Probability
Step 2: Impact
Step 3: Cost factor
Step 4: Degree of correction
Step 5: Human factor
Total risk rating Risk classification
Future
actions
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1.6.4.1 Number theory
A branch of mathematics concerned with the properties of the
integers (the numbers 0, 1, -1, 2, -2). Modern number theory made its
first great advances through the work of Leonhard Euler.5 Most of
the focus is on the analysis of prime numbers, i.e., those integers p
greater than 1 that are divisible only by 1 and p; the first few primes
are 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17 and 19. The fundamental theorem of
arithmetic asserts is that any positive integer a is a product of primes
that are unique, except for the order in which they are listed. For
example, the number 20 is uniquely the product of 2x2x5 (Levey &
Greenhall 1985:1094).
1.6.4.2 Function theory
The function theory in mathematics is described as a relation that
assigns to each member x of some set X (the domain) a unique
member y of some set Y (the range); y is said to be a function of x,
usually denoted f (x) (read “f of x”). In the equation y = f (x), x is
called the independent variable and y the dependent variable.
Although a function f assigns a unique y to each x, several x’s may
yield the same y; e.g., if y = f (x) = x 2 (where x is a number), then f
(2) = f (- 2) = 4. If this never occurs, then f is called a one-to-one, or
injunctive, function (Levey & Greenhall 1985:1095).
1.6.4.3 Sequence Theory
Authors such as Levey and Greenhall (1985:1095) describe sequence
in mathematics as an ordered set of mathematical quantities, called
terms. A sequence can be finite, like 1, 2, 3, …50, which has 50
                                                
5 Leonhard, Euler (1707-83) Swiss mathematician.  The most prolific mathematician who ever lived, he worked
at the St. Petersburg Academy of Science in Russia and at the Berlyn Academy. He contributed to areas of both
pure and applied mathematics, including calculus, analysis, and number theory.
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terms, or infinite, like 1, 2, 3, …, which has no final term. An infinite
sequence may or may not have a limit. Frequently there is a rule for
determining the terms in the sequence, as in the Fibonacci 6sequence
and in various types of progressions.
 Although the term “Mathematics” and “Quantitative”  represent the same
meaning, researcher will use both terms to make sense in the contexts it is
been used.
1.6.5 Statistics
Statistics is a branch of applied mathematics dealing with the collection and
classification of data by numerical characteristics and the use of these data to
make inferences and predictions in uncertain situations. Generally, measure-
ments taken from a small group, the sample, are used to infer the behaviour of
a larger group, the population, as in television ratings and election predictions.
The theory of probability is necessary to determine how well the sample
represents the population. Statistics is used in scientific and social research,
insurance and many other fields (Levey & Greenhall 1985: 1096).
1.6.6 Probability
Render et al (2003:34) describe probability as a numerical statement about the
chance that an event will occur. According to Le Roux (2002: 7) probability
measures the likelihood that an event will occur. Both definitions are of a
mathematical nature and its main emphasis is on the event that might occur.
According to Render et al (2003:34) there are also two basic rules regarding
the mathematics of probability:
                                                
6 Fibonacci  (1170 –1240) is an Italian mathematician and also known as Leonardo da Pisa.  The Fibonacci
sequence 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 13, 21, … in which each term is the sum of the two preceding terms, occurs in higher
mathematics in various connections (The Concise Columbia Encyclopedia, 1989,1991).
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· Probability, P, of any event or state of nature occurring is greater than or
equal to 0 and less than or equal to 1.  A probability of 0 indicates that an
event is never expected to occur. A probability of 1 means that an event is
always expected to occur;
· The sum of the simple probabilities for all possible outcomes of an activity
must equal 1.7
A more in-depth discussion on probability concepts and applications follows
in Chapter 3 under point 3.2.1.
1.6.7 Threat
According to Ozier (2003a:5) threat is a potentially undesirable event that
could result in loss or harm.
The experience of a threat event and its measurable loss or harm is distinct
from potential threat events and associated estimates of loss or harm. The
aggregation of threat-event experience data provides the basis for estimating
expected threat-event loss or harm in the future (Ozier 2003a:6).
1.6.8 Decision theory
Render et al (2003:78) is of the opinion that decision theory is an analytic and
systematic way to tackle problems. These problems can help managers in
making good decisions, based on logic.
Important in the decision theory is always the following fundamental steps,
which will be given more attention to in Chapter 2, paragraph 2.3.1. For the
purpose of this discussion the steps can be listed as follows:
                                                
7 Note that when you’re dealing with an infinite number of possible events, an event that could conceivably
happen might have probability zero. Consider the example of picking a random number between 1 and 10, what
is the probability that you’ll pick 5.0724? It’s zero, but it can happen. (Render et al 2003:35)
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· Define the problem;
· List possible alternatives;
· Identify the possible outcomes or states of nature;
· List the payoff or profit of each combination or alternatives and outcomes;
· Select one of the mathematical decision theory models; and
· Apply the model and make decisions.
1.6.9 Risk Impact8
Jenkins (1998:4) describes risk impact as losses as a result of threat activity,
which are normally expressed in one or more impact areas. Four areas are
commonly used: destruction, denial of service, disclosure and modification.
According to Martin and Tate (2002:2) risk impact is the effect the risk will
have if it does occur.
Le Roux (2002a: 9) is of the opinion that risk impact is the impact or the
consequence of any risk or threat, which has actually happened. According to
Ozier (2003a:6) the term impact points to the loss or harm attributable to a
threat event, quantitatively derived in monetary terms as Asset Value X
Exposure Factor = Impact, or single loss exposure, and qualitatively expressed
by a variety of metrics ranging from ordinal ranking to terms such as
“minimal”, acceptable”, and “unacceptable”. A more in-depth discussion on
the “impact” concept follows in chapter 4.
1.6.10 Private Security
In general it can by said that private security is an independent or proprietary
commercial organization whose activities include employee clearance in
investigations, maintaining the security of persons or property, performing the
                                                
8 Risk Impact will form part of a comprehensive discussion in Chapter 4
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functions of detection and investigation of crime and criminals, and
apprehension of offenders for reward, fee, or benefit. (Weaver 2003:16).9
1.7 SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS
A summary on chapter’s 2 to 8 is briefly summarised below.
Chapter 2 – Evolution of private security: theoretical basis
The concentration in this chapter is solely based on the theoretical approach of private
security and the risk analysis process. Some concept clarification, structuring and the
importance of legislation form a fundamental part of this discussion. Emphasis is also
placed on the education of the security manager in quantitative risk analysis as well as
the professionalism, which should be practiced at all times within the private security
industry. The future of private security in quantitative risk analysis will complete the
whole picture.
Chapter 3 – The probability concept within the risk analysis approach
The main thrust of this chapter is to describe the “probability” concept and its
application within the analysis process. It will also outline the importance of
probability as the first step in the development of the “TIQCAM” model. Lastly, it
will form a joined excel formation with the next chapter’s concept, which will also be
applied to the other chapters. This will smooth the discussion and complete the
development of the “TIQCAM” model in chapter 7.
Chapter 4 – Combinational approach of the impact concept
This chapter highlights the impact concept as the second step in the risk analysis
approach as well as the combination of “sensitivity” and “severity”. The importance
that the impact concept cannot function in isolation in developing a quantitative
analysis model will form part of the overall discussion.
                                                
9 A more comprehensive discussion will follow in Chapter 2.
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Chapter 5 – Essentiality of the cost factor in risk measuring
Attention is given to the cost factor as the essential and dynamic concept in the risk
analysis process. The development of the “TIQCAM” model involving the cost factor
will also lead to the importance of joint relationship with other concepts, such as the
degree of correction.
Chapter 6 – Degree of correction as a mitigational concept in the analysis process
Discussion will place the emphasis on the importance of the degree of correction
concept in achieving the most accurate outcome of the risk rating in the development
of the “TIQCAM” model. The emphasis is also placed on the importance of the
combining effect with the cost factor and other concepts in development process.
Chapter 7 – Human factor as a concept in quantitative risk analysis
The discussion in this chapter is totally the initiative of the researcher and places the
emphasis on the utmost importance of the human factor, also known as the “CHHP”
approach in the development of the “TIQCAM” model. This chapter will also aim to
integrate and/or join al the concepts (Chapter 3 –7) together in developing the model.
Guidelines for the implementation of the “TIQCAM” model shall conclude this
discussion.
Chapter 8 - Findings and recommendations
This is a general summary of the study that was undertaken and supplies an evaluation
of the findings relating to the objectives, hypotheses, methodology and empirical data.
Certain recommendations are made on the basis of the findings. Future tendencies in
respect of further developments of quantitative risk analysis models for private
security use are also discussed.
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1.8 CONCLUSION
The one major resource required for risk analysis in general, is trained human
resources. It is thus necessary for private security managers to be well educated in the
use of a workable quantitative risk analysis model. The rationale for this study in this
regard is discussed; clarification on key concepts, such as private security and risk
analysis aspects are taken in consideration as well as a foresight of the course of this
study.
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2 CHAPTER 2
EVOLUTION IN PRIVATE SECURITY: THEORETICAL BASIS
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Padwa (2001:1) states that while the United States economy was booming in the
1990’s and (dot) !-com mania was creating the illusions of new wealth, other parts of
the low-wage economy were experiencing high growth rates such as the private
security industry.
South Africa was also no exception and the growth of the private security industry has
its own problems such as training and education. Private security providers also need
to increase their professionalism and should start seeing their employees as assets that
are a long-term investment.
This researcher intends to sketch a brief historical context of private security in South
Africa. This discussion will also share some thoughts on the current status of the
industry and finally conclude with the importance of quantitative risk analysis by
private security managers.
It is generally believed that a security policy in the future plans of trade and industry
is an internationally established practice to overcome the threat against profitability.
In South Africa crime remains the single largest threat. The researcher is of the
opinion that educating and practicing quantitative risk analysis will not only lower the
crime rate but also earn more responsibility that adds value in the customer’s eyes and
thus place professionalism in the forefront.
The security services industry serves and protects primarily the interest and assets of
industry and commerce in order to maintain profitability, economic growth and job
creation, as well as to develop welfare and stability among the various communities.
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Further, it is the researcher’s contention that the private security industry will benefit,
in not only educating their managers in business and financial skills, labour relation
skills, judicial and commercial knowledge and specialized security practice, but
mainly in the quantitative risk analysis process, which forms part of the every day
program.
2.2 HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE PRIVATE SECURITY
INDUSTRY
Contrary to popular belief, private security, particularly as a profession, is not a
relatively modern development.  A study of history from the beginnings of mankind
shows that the protection of life and property is one of the oldest tasks both faced and
undertaken by men (Christman 2003a:1).
Because private security as we know it today has developed as the result of a
multitude of ideas, concepts, historical events and identifiable individuals and
personalities, and because private security has become an essential and necessary
ingredient of modern business, industry and society; some knowledge of how it
developed is not only interesting but also helpful in understanding this emerging
profession and its future.
Although the history of private security can be dated back to the ancient and biblical
periods, this discussion will only focus from the 1880’s and with the emphasis on the
United States and South Africa.
2.2.1 History in Europe and United States
Christman (2003a:1) is of the opinion that the modern–day private security had
its beginnings through Sir Robert Peel, Home Secretary of England, who
guided a bill through Parliament, entitled “An Act for improving the police in
and near the Metropolis”.  World War II was the real source and stimulus of
the modern and complex private security industry today.  Private security
actually came off the ground in the mid 1880’s.  According to Christman
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(2003a:2)  Allen Pinkerton, a former policemen, was the first to form a private
agency, specialising in providing security services for railroads and industrial
organisations. The Pinkerton, Brinks and Burns companies all continue in
business today.
Beginning in the second half of the 20th century, private security (whether
proprietary or contractual) has played an increasingly larger role in crime
control and prevention, so that as of 1985 the resources of money (over 20
billion dollars annually) and personnel (over 700,000) exceed that of public
law enforcement.  The most recent trend is the “privatisation” of functions
such as running jails and prisons, which were previously the jobs of
government exclusively  (Christman 2003a:5).
Private security is big business in all free-world countries and ranges from the
single owner/operator private detective agency or security consultant through
national contract security guard companies and investigative agencies, to
multi-national security firms and alarm companies. The thousands of
proprietary security personnel, working only for a single employer and in his
interests only, must also be included (Christman 2003a:5).
According to Christman (2003a:5) the industry, because of its size, has begun
to attract the attention of legislatures and of the courts, and in those instances
where self-restraint and legal and ethical considerations are neglected, the
legislatures and courts are establishing the standards under which we the
private security Industry are required to operate. In other cases, the courts are
also punishing, through monetary awards to injured parties, those private
security practitioners who “go too far” and offend public sensibilities.
The Industry is also growing in sophistication and professionalism. It is
attracting personnel and leaders who would be a credit to any profession.
With both continued growth and professionalism, which seems assured, the
future of private security and that of those in the profession, seems bright
(Christman 2003a:6).
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2.2.2 History in South Africa
In South Africa the private security has a number of unique features because
of the political context in which the industry developed.  In Europe and the
US, the security Industry’s expansion in the 1970’s and early 1980’s occurred
without any real input or assistance from the state.  This was not the case in
South Africa (Irish : 1999:1).
In the late 1970’s and throughout the 1980’s, the former South African Police
(SAP) withdrew from many normal policing duties to concentrate on
maintaining political control.  The Government encouraged the private
security Industry to fill the gap left by the police’s shift in priorities, which led
to a close relationship between private and public policing, but with different
goals. The Government also assisted the Industry by providing mechanisms
with which the Industry could link up formally with the State security
apparatus.  In 1991, at a Security Association of South Africa (SASA)
conference, Lieutenant General Basie Smit hinted at the establishment of a
joint working committee to produce a blueprint on co-operation between the
SAP and the private security Industry. In 1992, the then Commissioner of
Police, General Johan van der Merwe, considered the creation of a permanent
secretariat consisting of SAP and private security industry representatives
(Irish 1999: 1).
Irish (1999: 1) also indicates that at a formal level, the state used private
security companies to guard strategic installations.  In 1980, The National Key
Points Act was passed. Act No.102 of 1980, granted greater powers to the
private security guards who were tasked with guarding strategic installations,
including full powers of arrest, and search and seizure.
The question whether the Government at the time and those working in the
private security industry had similar interests has been raised on several
occasions. Many security companies have strongly refuted any allegations of
mutual interest.  However, according to members of the Security Officer’s
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Board, the government might have channelled funds into certain private
security companies and used them as front companies (Irish 1999: 1).
Because of South Africa’s past involvement in military operations in other
African states, and the immigration to South Africa of people who fought in
the bush wars in the then Rhodesia and other African states, a large number of
people with experience in counterinsurgency and low intensity conflict
operations live in South Africa.  Not surprisingly, many owners and managers
of private security companies have military, intelligence and police
backgrounds.  One security company manager said initially it was his
company’s policy only to recruit people who had been members of the SAP.
In the 1970’s, the policy was extended to include army and correctional
services personnel (Irish 1999: 1).
According to Irish (1999:1), many companies still regard the recruitment of
personnel with a previous security background as desirable.  The involvement
of former military and police personnel has had a marked impact on the
profile, structure and training and even uniforms of private security companies
in South Africa.  There is a large group of people with combat experience who
fought both for and against apartheid who find a natural home in the private
security industry, both in their capacity as employers and employees.  Some of
these individuals, who have been forced to take early retirement because of
their past involvement in apartheid-sponsored violence, are qualified for little
else than narrowly defined security work.
Another common area is that of investigation of crime.  It was not uncommon
to find security guards involved in unlawful methods of interrogation.  There
have been a number of reports of security personnel being actively involved in
the interrogation and torture of suspected bank robbers or of internal
investigation units interrogating their own guards who have been suspected of
involvement in inside jobs (Irish 1999:1).
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2.2.2.1 Private security after 1994
After the first democratic elections in 1994, the levels of reporting
crime increased dramatically and the true extent of violent crime as
distinct from political crime began to emerge.
May (1996:130) is of the opinion that the state of emergency from
1985 to 1990 probably suppressed crime levels, as well as the reporting
and recording of those crimes that did occur.  Political liberalization in
the early 1990’s witnessed an apparent crime explosion as social
controls were loosened and police were released from duties of
suppressing political violence. During this period the crimes
committed, particularly property crimes, were accompanied by
excessive violence.
According to Schönteich (2002:11) over a ten-year period, between
1988 and 1997, the number of reported murders and rapes increased
two and a half times and reported robberies almost three times.
Serious crimes against property also rose considerably over that period.
Dempster (2002:1) is of opinion that crime increases get to the
situation where no matter how hard you work, and no matter what you
do, you can never stop crime.
Consequently, many companies and individuals who could afford to
engage the services of private security companies, particularly armed
response, did so thereby continuing the trend that existed before 1994.
Although private security companies seem able to respond faster to
calls for assistance, they are still seen by most affluent South Africans
as a “grudge buy”, a purchase they would rather not have to make
(Dempster 2002:3).
The other main concern is that of the poorer companies that cannot
afford the services of private security companies.  This entrenches the
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disparities between the rich and the poor, which actually implies that
policing in South Africa is spread unevenly such as in the black
communities.  This latter also contributes to the growth of the private
security industry.
The private security industry seeks to protect the interests of its paying
customers, while the police act in public interest.  It can thus be said
that security companies are focused more on the prevention of loss
than the detection of offenders.   The exercise of discretion by private
security personnel will be far more influenced by their perceptions of
the interests of their immediate employer than on any generalized
conception of the public interest.   Offenders will only be handed over
to the police if this is in the perceived interest of the customer.
It is also necessary to point out that the private security personnel don’t
have the same legal powers as Police members.  Private security
officers only have the same rights as citizens.
Private security officers do however have discretion once they are in
the private property of their customers.
2.3 DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS
As stated in Chapter 1 under point 1.6, it is now necessary to elaborate on the
following concepts.
2.3.1 Private security
 Fischer and Green (1992:74) indicate that private security includes those self-
employed individuals and privately funded business entities and organizations
providing security-related services to specific clientele for a fee, for the
individual or entity that retains or employs them, or for themselves, in order to
protect their persons, private property, or interests from varied hazards.
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The South African Police Service is actually of the opinion that with the
upliftment of deprived communities and the role public and private
institutions/organizations have to play in the Reconstruction and Development
Programme, the following fundamental question needs to be answered: Must
poor people be dependent on the public police for protection while those who
can afford it, buy their own (professional) security? (Van Vuuren 1998:13).
According to Bosch (1999:4) private security refers to those efforts by
individuals and organizations to protect their assets from loss, harm or
reduction in value, due to criminal actions.
The researcher is of opinion that private security in South Africa is plain and
simple. It can be seen as that of a non-government company, which is only
compelled to render a service to their clients who can afford their services.
Private security is also called contract security. In South Africa the business
society is more familiar with the term contract security. For the purpose of this
study the focus will mostly be on the term “private security”.
2.3.2 Private security manager
A private security manager is a manager employed by a private security
organization in rendering a security service to their clients. The security
manager must be registered according to the Private Security Industry
Regulatory Act, Act 56 of 2001 and must be an “A”-grade, which means that
the focus is on the total spectrum of security management.
The term security manager also indicates that management is a fundamental
part of the whole security process.  According to Marx, Van Rooyen, Bosch
and Reynders (1998:352) management is a rational process, which focuses on
resources such as planning, organizing, leadership, coordination and control to
reach for goals.
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According to Le Roux (2002b:4) management can also be categorized in a
three- step pathway as shown in figure 2.1 below.
Figure 2.1: Three-step career path of management
Source: Own compilation
For the purpose of developing a quantitative risk analyses model for the
private security manager and for this study as a whole, the term security
manager will include all three the career paths of management.
2.3.3 Physical security
The fact that this study concerns the physical security risk aspects, it is also
necessary to give a brief definition on physical security. According to Rogers
(1997:25) physical security is aimed at the implementation of physical barriers
in order that risks may be managed. These risks include a wide variety of
crimes such as robbery, fraud, theft, housebreaking and vehicle theft.
One of the main basic principles of any physical programme or system
according to Van der Westhuizen (1989:5), is the analysis and decision
making to prevent and control crime-related losses.
It is also of the utmost importance for the security manager to know and
understand risk, the term risk analysis and quantitative risk analysis. A brief
discussion of the latter terms follows.
SENIOR MANAGEMENT
MIDDLE MANAGEMENT
JUNIOR MANAGEMENT
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2.3.4 What is risk?
Risk is associated with virtually every activity one can think of, but for the
purpose of this discussion, it will be limited to the uncertainty of financial
loss. According to Broder (2000:1) it can also indicate damage or any other
undesirable event.  Kastrup (2000:2) perception is that risk can also be defined
as the probability that certain damage will occur. Risk analysis should also
examine the vulnerability of an object, which can be defined by two questions:
First, how easy is it to cause damage to the object; and second, how much time
and efforts are required to revert to the “status quo ante”, that is, the state
before the damage occurred (Kastrup 2000:2). Most people desire low risk,
which would translate to a high probability of success, profit, or some form of
gain.
Almost any change, good or bad, poses some risk. The analysis will usually
reveal numerous potential risk areas: overtime costs, inventory shortages,
future sales, geological survey results, personnel fluctuations, unpredictable
demand, changing labour costs, etc.  The division of risk can be limited to
three common categories according to Broder, (2000:1):
· Personal (having to do with people’s assets)
· Property (having to do with material assets)
· Liability (having to do with legalities that could affect both of the above,
such as errors and omissions, wrongful discharge, workplace violence, and
sexual harassment, to name a few of the most current legal issues that
plague the business community).
Le Roux (2002a: 1) indicates that risk also takes many forms. It is therefore
necessary to use systematic processes and tools to understand and prioritise
risks, especially those with catastrophic consequences. Traditionally, we have
measured risk in the following way:
Risk = Frequency (F) x Consequence (C)
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In this equation;
Frequency (F) = Initiating event frequency x probability of all safeguards
fail
On the other hand, in security risk management the frequency element of the
above equation is separated into two parts as:
Risk = [Threat (T) x Vulnerability (V)] x Consequence (C)
According to the above equation;
· Threat is the measure of the likelihood that a specific type of attack will be
initiated against a specific target;
· Vulnerability is the measure of the likelihood that various types of
safeguards against a scenario will fail;
· Consequence is the magnitude of the negative effects if the attack is
successful.
So, it can be noted that risk can be measured in the same way, but with slightly
different terminology.
2.3.5 Risk analysis terminology
There may be some terminology and definition differences related to risk
analysis, risk assessment and business impact analysis. Although several
definitions are possible and can overlap, the following terminology and
definition of  Wold and Shriver (1997:1-2) can be considered:
· A risk analysis involves identifying the most probable threats to an
organization and analysing the related vulnerabilities of the organization to
these threats;
· A risk assessment involves evaluating existing physical and environmental
security and controls, and assessing their adequacy relative to the potential
threats of the organization;
· A business impact analysis involves identifying the critical business
functions within the organization and determining the impact of not
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performing the business function beyond the maximum acceptable outage.
Types of criteria that can be used to evaluate the impact include: customer
service, internal operations, legal/statutory and financial issues.
Jenkins (1998:4) is of the opinion that in order to discuss security risk analysis
concepts, a baseline must first be established of related terms and how they are
used to analyse risk. The following terms are applicable:
· Asset – Anything with value and in need of protection;
· Threat – An action or potential action with the propensity to cause
damage;
· Vulnerability – A condition of weakness. If there were no vulnerabilities,
there would be no concern for threat activity;
· Countermeasure – Any device or action with the ability to reduce
vulnerability;
· Expected loss – The anticipated negative impact to assets due to threat
manifestation;
· Impact – Losses as a result of threat activity are normally expressed in one
or more impact areas. Four areas are commonly used, namely destruction,
denial of service, disclosure and modification.
Jenkins (1998:4) furthermore explains how related terms work together.
According to him a security risk analysis is an examination of the
interrelationship between assets, threats, vulnerabilities and countermeasures
to determine the current level of risk. The level of risk that remains after
consideration of all in-place countermeasures, vulnerability levels, and related
threats is called residual risk.
Any given threat in the population of threats is poised to take advantage of
system vulnerabilities; countermeasures reduce the level of vulnerability, the
asset is what needs to be protected, and the impacts are the result of threat
activity through residual risk.
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According to Broder (2000:2) risk analysis is a management tool which main
function is the identification of assets that need protection.  The probability of
risk occurrences and the impact or effect is then to be considered for
implementing the right countermeasures.  Although Broder’s view is the same
as the authors Jenkins (1998:4) and Wold and Shriver (1997:1-2) regarding the
related terms used in risk analysis, he rather places the emphasis on the term
“estimating” than “analysis”.  Broder (2000:2) argues that risk analysis will
never be an exact science and that the term “estimating” is fairly easy to use to
estimate the probability of occurrences or events.
Taking Broder’s argument into account, the researcher is of the opinion that
the term “estimating” is historical in the sense that in 431 B.C, the term was
used in an excerpt from Pericle, an Athenian general’s speech (See point
2.3.1.2).
The terminology “risk analysis”, “risk assessment”, “risk evaluation” and “risk
estimating” are sometimes also considered to be the same conception.  The
question can thus be asked: What are the differences between the
abovementioned terminologies or is there any difference at all? Addison
(2002:2) indicates that risk analysis is also known as risk assessment, which
focuses on the process of identifying the hazards and their causes, determining
the consequences of the hazards, and calculating the probability of their
occurrences.  The perception that calculation, which forms part of the risk
assessment and/or risk analysis process, can also interoperate as estimating of
an occurrence.
Berryman (2002:2) is of the opinion that the focus must be on risk assessment
rather than risk analysis. To him, risk assessment means the gathering of
information, which means that the data itself must be estimated to get to the
cost factor.
Addison (2002:3) is of the opinion that there is a definite difference between
the terms “assessment” and “analysis”.  Assessment focuses on the financial
44
and business aspects while analysis is associated with the personal insights of
the company’s personnel.  Schirick (2000:1) is of a different opinion regarding
the perception of Addison (2002:3). To him, risk analysis and evaluation has
one meaning, which also focused on the process of identification and
estimating the costs.
According to Render et al (2003:2) analysis and specifically quantitative
analysis is a scientific approach to managerial decision-making. Whim,
emotions, and guesswork are not part of the quantitative approach.  This
approach starts with data.  Like raw material for a factory, these data are
manipulated or processed into information that is valuable to managers in
making decisions.
Whatever the different views may be, the researcher is of the opinion that the
foresaid terms are so closely associated with each other in the overall process
that the main objective must be to link all the information gathered to assist
businesses to manage their risks.
Within the scientific framework of risk analysis, risk communication is an
important management tool for making critical decisions, and in some cases
meeting regulatory requirements. According to Reksnes (2003:1)
communication in the recent years has been acknowledged as playing an
important part, often decisive as regards the outcome or effect of risk
assessment and risk management on opinions or behaviours. For the purpose
of this discussion the following definition of risk communication by Reksnes
(2003:1) can be used as - “Access to information and participation in the
process of risk analysis”.
2.3.6 Quantitative risk analysis
According to Render et al (2003:2) quantitative analysis is the scientific
approach to managerial decision-making. Whim, emotions and guesswork are
not part of the quantitative analysis approach. The approach starts with data.
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Like theft or fraud in a company, this data is manipulated or processed into
information that is valuable for decision-making purposes. Computers are
instrumental in the increased use of quantitative analysis (see 2.10). According
to Berryman (2002:6) the quantitative approach is not widely used because it
involves calculating numerically the probability when an event will occur, then
assigning an amount to the impact of the occurrence, which will not always
reflect a true version of both the probabilities and impact.
The other approach, and the most widely used form of calculating risk, is the
qualitative approachability. Berryman (2002:6) is of the opinion that this
involves subjectively rating the probability and the impact. What needs to be
considered is that for each vulnerability rate, the probability may occur. It
must be indicated as high, medium or low. Then independently rate the cost
this may have on the organization as high, medium or low. To do this,
Berryman (2002:6) suggests that data input from the business community
plays a vital role in rating the cost, because in most environments, they are
considered the owners of the data. So obviously, if a particular vulnerability
has a high probability of occurring and a high dollar impact if it were to occur,
the risk would be considered high.
According to Le Roux (2002a: 2) both quantitative and qualitative factors
should also be considered. The weather, legislation and social economical
aspects may all be factors that are difficult to quantify. Because of the
importance of qualitative factors, the role of quantitative analysis in the
decision making process can vary. When there is a lack of qualitative factors
and when the problem, model and input data remain the same, the results of
quantitative factors can automate the decision making process. For example,
some companies use quantitative inventory models to determine automatically
when to order additional new material/equipment. In most cases, however,
quantitative analysis will be an aid to the decision-making process (Render et
al 2003:2).
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For the purpose of this study, the researcher is of the opinion that the
quantitative approach is more fundamental in the exact prioritising of risks if
all quantitative factors are taken into consideration, and not only the
probability and impact of risk as indicated by Berryman (2002:6) The different
concepts shall be dealt with in Chapter’s 3 to 7.
2.4 BASIC OVERVIEW IN UNDERSTANDING QUANTITATIVE
RISK ANALYSIS BY PRIVATE SECURITY
It is important that the security manager be acquainted with the quantitative risk
analysis approach and also understands that the term “quantitative” mainly involves
mathematics. The researcher’s perception is that this understanding should be the
basics when educating the security manager in quantitative risk analysis as discussed
below.
2.4.1 Mathematics, analysis and management in history
 Historical information regarding mathematics, analysis and management
gained from the Concise Columbia Encyclopedia (Levey & Greenhall
1985:1089) is as follows:
2.4.1.1 Socrates role in mathematics
It can be said that Socrates (469-399 BC), Greek philosopher,
Athens, is regarded as one of the wisest men of all time in
mathematics. It is not known who his teachers were, but he seems to
have been acquainted with the doctrines of Parmenides, Heraclitus
and Anaxagoras10.  Socrates himself left no writings, and most of our
knowledge about mathematics comes from the dialogues of his most
                                                
10 Parmenides (515 BC), Pre-Socratic Greek philosopher. Major contribution to the method of reasoned proof
assertions.
Heraclitus (535 –475BC), Greek philosopher.  He taught that there is no permanent reality except the reality of
change, a position illustrated by his famous maxim “You cannot step twice in the same river.”
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famous pupil, Plato11 and from the memoirs of Xenophon12.
Mathematics is very broadly divided into foundations, algebra,
analysis and geometry.  From his interest in the mathematics, it can
thus be said that the quantitative theory arose from where it is used
today as a modern physical theory in the quantitative analysis
approach (Levy & Greenhall 1985:1089).
2.4.1.2 Origination of mathematics and analysis
The earliest records according to Levy and Greenhall (1985:1089),
indicate that mathematics arose in response to the practical needs of
agriculture, business, and industry in the 3rd and 2nd millennia BC in
Egypt and Mesopotamia, and possibly India and China.
Mathematical analysis shows that analysis was done on a basis of
individual knowledge with little or none scientific techniques during
the period of imperialist colonization in the 16th-19th centuries on
archaeology.  Scientific techniques and systematic methodologies
became increasingly useful towards the end of the 19th century when
archaeology is driven as an academic study.  The main risks that
were faced by archaeologists during the rescue of physical remains
are the excavation of sites at risk from deep ploughing, quarrying and
road laying.
According to Render et al (2003:3) mathematical analysis (also
called quantitative analysis) has been in existence since the beginning
of recorded history, but it was Frederick W. Taylor who in the early
1900’s pioneered the principles of the scientific approach to
management.
                                                                                                                                                       
Anaxagoras (500-428BC), Greek philosopher, thought to have been the teacher of Socrates.  He held that an
all-pervading onus (world-mind) ordered the physical world by combining particles from the undifferentiated
mass of the universe.
11 Plato (427-347BC), Greek philosopher and famous pupil and friend of Socrates.  His extant work is in the
form of epistles and dialogues divided according to the probable order of composition.
12 Xenophon (430-355), Greek historian. A well-to-do young disciple of Socrates. His most famous work, the
Anabasis, was written in exile in Sparta.
48
Stamatelatos (2000:4) points out that historically, risk assessment can
be traced back in 431 B.C.  The following is an excerpt from a
speech of Pericle, an Athenian general, to his troops before a battle in
the war between Athens and Sparta:
“ We the Athenians in our own persons, take our decisions on policy
and submit them to proper discussion. The worst thing is to rush into
action before the consequences have been properly debated. And this
is another point where we differ from other people. We are capable
at the same time of TAKING RISKS AND ESTIMATING THEM
BEFOREHAND. Others are brave out of ignorance, and when they
stop to think, they begin to fear. But the man who can most truly be
accounted brave is he who best knows the meaning of what is sweet
in life, and what is terrible, and he then goes out undeterred to meet
what is to come”.
Thus can it be said that the past paved the way for risk analysis in all
sectors of the community today. Risk analysis is now regarded as
mandatory in many quarters, for example by the Government for all
its new IT projects.  Also in the private sector, particularly public
listed companies and those who are seeking a public listing, need to
comply with the Turnbull (UK) Report on Corporate Governance
requirements, which prescribes undertaking an analysis of business
risks (Shaw 2002:1). This is also applicable to South African
companies concerning corporate governance as laid out in the King
report (King: 1994:5).
During World War II, many new scientific and quantitative
techniques were developed to assist the military. These new
developments were so successful that after World War II many
companies started using similar techniques in managerial decision
making and planning. Today, many organizations employ a staff of
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operations research or management science personnel or consultants
to apply the principles of scientific management to problems and
opportunities (Render et al 2003:3).
Many of the techniques and principles of scientific management
discussed in this study were first developed by Taylor (Render et al
2003:3).
2.4.1.3 The quantitative risk analysis approach
Many authors have different views regarding the quantitative
analysis approach.  Martin and Tate (2002:1) use the Step-by-Step
approach in analysing risk.  Quantification is the main step by which
a team determines the risk ratings for each risk. The second step is
the evaluation approach. The approach by Martin and Tate (2002:2)
is mainly to rate the probability and the impact of each risk.
Davis (2002:01) is of the opinion that quantitative approach consists
only of hazard identification and impact analysis. This approach is
not adequate enough to train individuals in the total quantification
approach. The probability, cost of risk and degree of correction are
not taken into consideration with their quantitative approach.  As in
the case of  Martin and Tate (2002:1), no exact quantification can be
done if the whole of the quantification approach is not adhered to.
This means that factors such as developing a model, and testing the
model before implementing the results should be taken into account.
According to Blackburn (2002:5) it is important that by identifying,
recording and monitoring potential risk across the organization
permits sophisticated analysis techniques to be used. Quantifying
risks allow the manager to perform analysis in all parts of the
organization. However, the researcher is once again of the opinion
that this is not the right way of approaching the quantification of
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risks. This approach is not really a quantitative approach but rather a
process. If one looks at the Risk Management process it indicates that
risks must first be identified, then evaluated and then risk controls
and or actions can be applied.
It is the researcher’s perception that the said approaches will make it
really difficult for the security manager to cope. It is the aim of the
researcher to provide a quantitative risk analysis model (see chapter
7), which is easy to use and thus provide the security manager with a
tool that is reliable and as far as possible, trustworthy.
Render et al (2003:3) is of the opinion that as with the normal
quantitative analysis approach, the quantitative risk analysis
approach will also consist of defining the problem, developing a
model, acquiring input data, developing a solution, testing the
solution, analysing the results and implementing the results (see
Figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1: The quantitative analysis approach
THE QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS APPROACH
Defining the
problem
Developing a
model
Acquiring input
data
Developing a
solution
Testing the
solution
Analyzing the
results
Implementing
the results
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Source: Render, Stair and Hanna (2003:3)
2.4.1.3.1 Defining the problem
According to Render et al (2003:3) the first step in the
quantitative approach is to develop a clear concise
statement of the problem. The statement will give
direction and meaning to the following steps. Problem
focusing must always be on selecting those problems
whose solutions will result in the greatest increase in
profits or reduction in costs to the company.
  2.4.1.3.2     Developing a model
Once the problem is selected to be analysed, the next step
according to Render et al (2003:3) is to develop a model.
A model is a representation (usually numerical or
statistical) of a situation. There are many types of models.
Architects sometimes make a physical model of a
building that they will construct. Engineers develop scale
models of chemical plants. A schematic model is a
picture, drawing or chart of reality. What sets quantitative
analysis apart from other techniques is that the models
used are mathematical. A more comprehensive discussion
on this subject will be dealt with in Chapter 7.
2.4.1.3.2 Acquiring input data
Once a model is developed, data must be obtained to be
used in the model. According to Render et al (2003:4)
obtaining data for the model is essential and must be a
representation of the reality. Improper data will result in
misleading results.
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There are a number of sources that can be used in
collecting data. In some cases, company reports and
documentation can be used. Interviews with employees
can also reveal with a great degree of accuracy the amount
of time in producing a product, etc. Insurance companies
can also be of great help in collecting data.
2.4.1.3.3 Developing a solution
The input data and the model not only determine the
accuracy of the solution but also involve manipulating the
model to arrive at the best (optimal) solution to the
problem. Render et al (2003:5) states that if the input data
are accurate to only two significant digits, then the results
can be accurate to only two significant digits. For
example, the results of dividing 2.6 by 1.4 should be 1.9,
not 1.857142857.
It is researcher’s opinion that instead of developing and
reporting one solution, the quantitative analysts should at
least produce more than one solution. This allows more
discretion in the decision-making process and also leaves
the door open for wider use (e.g. planning and decision
making which is levelled on the same functional line).
2.4.1.3.4 Testing the solution
Assumptions of the model and the solution must always
be carefully tested. According to Render et al (2003:5)
there are several ways to test input data. One method of
testing the data is to collect additional data from a
different source. If the original data were collected using
interviews, perhaps some additional data can be collected
by direct measurement or sampling. These additional data
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can then be compared with the original data, and
statistical tests can be employed to determine whether
there are differences between the original data and the
additional data.
2.4.1.3.5 Analysing the results
Render et al (2003:5) not only place the emphasis on
analysing the results, but also place a great degree of
importance on sensitivity analysis. Sensitivity analysis
determines how the solutions will change with a different
model or input data. Because input data may not always
be accurate or model assumptions may not be completely
appropriate, sensitivity analysis can become an important
part of the quantitative analysis approach.
2.4.1.3.6 Implementing the results
The final step is to implement the results. After the
solution has been implemented, it should be closely
monitored. According to Render et al (2003:3) there may
be numerous changes that call for modification of the
original solution. A changing economy, fluctuating
demand, and model enhancements requested by managers
and decision makers are only a few examples of changes
that might require the analysis to be modified.
Wayne and Albright (1997:8-9) also support the seven-
step process but in a different approach.  They fully agree
on the first step in defining the problem. The second step
should be the collection of data and then the developing of
the model, which is not the case with Render et al
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(2003:7) steps. Acquiring input of data forms part of the
latter author’s steps.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the comparison of both Render et al
(2003:3-6) and Wayne and Albright (1997:8-9) seven step
modelling process.
Figure 2.2: Comparison of a seven-step modelling process
Source: Own compilation
Although the researcher agrees that both the authors’
perceptions on the seven-step modelling process is just a
process followed in making the end product work, he would
rather support the approach by Wayne and Albright (1997:8-9)
because no development of a model can take place unless the
input data is collected beforehand.
Although there is not a big difference in both the Render et al
(2003:3-6) and Wayne and Albright (1997:8-9) processes, it
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55
remains their prerogative to approach their models in their own
way.
The application for this study will be based on Wayne and
Albright (1997:8-9) process regarding the quantitative risk
analysis model for the private security managers.
Step 1: Define the problem
Problem is that no quantitative risk analysis model exists for
the private security managers to analize physical and
quantifiable risks, for example robbery and fraud.
Step 2: Necessary data is collected (informal interviews as discussed in
Chapter 1 under points 1.5.3.1 and 1.5.3.3.
Step 3: In Chapter 5 the focus will be solely be on the development of
a quantitative risk analysis model for security managers, which
will deal with probabilities, impact etc., regarding the risk
situations.
Step 4: The model will then be verified for its accuracy. If not accurate,
alternatives will be selected as per step 5.
Step 5: Selection of alternatives means that the developed model be
tested against other existing models, if they exist. Otherwise
this model will then be called an easy-to-use model for security
managers.
Step 6: Presentation of the model is the involvement of security
managers in the use thereof. This is called the testing period to
test the workability of the developed model.
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Step 7: The implementation of a quantitative risk analysis will be a
contribution for the security industry. Regular evaluation of the
model will take place in order to secure its accuracy.
2.4.2 Possible problems in the quantitative analysis approach
Regarding the above quantitative analysis approach by Wayne and Albright
(1997:8-9), it is the researcher’s perception that this is a more acceptable
approach but there are the following possible problems:
Defining the problem, managers are not always proactive in handling
problems. They sometimes wait for a problem to arise and then attack the
problem until it is solved. Once it is solved, they then sit back and relax until
the next problem arises.
Conflicting viewpoints in defining the problem also exists. Financial managers
may have a different viewpoint and approach regarding defining the problem.
They usually feel that the inventory is too high, as inventory represents cash
not available for other investments. Sales managers, on the other hand, often
feel that the inventory is too low, as high levels of inventory may be needed to
fill an unexpected order. For the security manager, physical aspects (theft,
fraud, etc.) will always be rated as high on both financial and the physical
sides, unless proper control measures are implemented.
The main concern in developing a model is the understanding of the model.
Managers simply will not use the results of any model they do not understand.
One approach is to start of with a simple model and make sure that it is
completely understood. Such a simple and easy to use model is demonstrated
in tables 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4.
Collecting data plays a major role in the whole of the quantitative analysis
approach and the emphasis must be placed on validity. A lack of good, clean
data must always be distilled and manipulated before used in a model. It often
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happens that data is of a subjective nature and will not always reflect the true
version thereof. It is a known fact that two persons will have their own views
regarding a subject and therefore data, which is represented by them, will have
a subjective connotation.
The development of a solution is normally based on the understanding
philosophy. Understanding of the mathematics can cause problems for
managers that are not using it in their day-to-day activities even though the
models are complex and powerful. The second problem is that quantitative
models usually give just one answer to a problem. Render et al (2003: 15) go
further by saying that managers would like to have a range of options and not
be put in a take-it-or-leave-it position.
When testing the solution managers are always asked how good the solution
looks to them. This creates problems in the sense that managers in different
disciplines don’t always see eye to eye. For one the solution is acceptable and
for the other not. Mainly the big rejection is when the model is too complex
and tends to give solutions that are not intuitively obvious.
The biggest problem in analysing the results is when the results indicate large
changes in the organization’s policy; the quantitative analysis model can be
rejected.
In the researcher’s experience over the years, there is a lack of management
support and user involvement in the successful implementation of systems.
The implementation of a quantitative analysis model can thus also cause
problems if top management doesn’t force their authority down to junior and
senior management in using quantitative analyses.
2.4.3 Mathematical tools in the quantitative approach
It is generally known that computers play a fundamental role in mathematical
calculations. This makes the steps such as developing a solution, testing the
solution and analyzing the results much easier (See figure 2.1). The following
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discussion on the computer is taken from “The Concise Columbia
Encyclopedia”( Levey & Greenhall 1985:998).
2.4.3.1 History
Although the development of digital computers is rooted in the
abacus13 and early mechanical calculation devices, Charles
Babbage 14 is credited with the design of the first modern computer.
The first fully automatic calculator was the Mark I, or automatic
sequence controlled calculator, began in 1939 at Harvard by Howard
Aiken, while the first all-purpose electronic digital computer, ENIAC
(Electronic Numerical Integrator And Calculator), which used
thousands of vacuum tubes, was completed in 1946 at the University
of Pennsylvania.
UNIVAC (Universal Automatic Computer) became (1951) the first
computer to handle both numerics an alphabetic data with equal
facility. First-generation computers were supplanted by the
transistorised computers of the late 1950’s and early 1960’s, second-
generation machines that could perform a million operations per
second. The third-generation integrated-circuit machines of the mid-
1960 and 1970’s, in turn, replaced them. The 1980’s were
characterized by the development of the microprocessor and the
evolution of increasingly smaller but powerful mini computers, and
personal computers.
2.4.3.2 Computer
A computer is a device capable of performing a series of arithmetic
or logical operations. A computer is distinguished from a calculating
machine, such as an abacus or electronic calculator, by being able to
                                                
13  Abacus, an ancient computing device using movable beads strung on a number of parallel wires within a
frame.  Each wire represents a decimal place: ones, tens, hundreds, and so on.  The beads are grouped to form
numbers and shifted in specified patterns to add, subtract, multiply or divide.
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store a computer program (so that it can repeat its operations and
make logical decisions) and to store and retrieve data without human
intervention. A schematic illustration of a computer system as per
Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: Schematic illustration of a computer system :red
lines indicate data flow; black lines indicates control
signals.
Source:  Levey and Greenhall (1985:998)
Computers are classed as analog or digital. An analog computer
operates on continuously varying data. A digital computer performs
operations on discrete data. An analog computer represents data as
                                                                                                                                                       
14 Charles Babbage, 1792 –1871, English mathematician and famous for his attempts to develop a mechanical
computational aid he called the “analytical engine”.   Although it was never constructed and was decimal
rather than binary in conception, it clearly anticipated the modern digital computer.
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physical quantities and operates on the data by manipulating the
quantities. In a complex analog computer, continuously varying data
are converted into varying electrical quantities and the relationship of
the data is determined by establishing an equivalent relationship, or
analog, among the electrical quantities. Analog computers have been
nearly completely replaced by more effective digital computers.
Within a digital computer, data are expressed in binary notation, i.e.,
by a series of “on-off” conditions that represent the digits “1” and
“0”. A series of eight consecutive binary digits, or bits, is called a
byte and follows 256 “on-off” combinations. Each byte can thus
represent one of up to 256 alphanumeric characters. Arithmetic
comparative operations can be performed on data represented in this
way and the result stored for later use. Digital computers are used for
reservation systems, scientific, investigation, data processing
applications, and electronic games.
2.4.3.3 Personal computer
Personal computer (PC), a small but powerful computer primarily
used in an office or home without the need to be connected to a
larger computer. PC’s evolved after the development of the
microprocessor made possible by the hobby-computer movement of
the late 1970’s, when some computers were built from components
or kits. In the early 1980’s the first low-cast, fully assembled units
were mass-marketed. The typical configuration consists of a video
display, keyboard, logic unit, and storage device and, frequently,
modem. Some current PC’s have more computing power than the
large mainframe computers of the 1950’s and early 1960’s.
2.4.3.4 Excel spreadsheet tool
One of the main mathematical tools used on computers is the
spreadsheet model. Many add-in programs exist to make Excel,
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which is already a wonderful tool for modelling, even more powerful
in solving quantitative analysis problems. For the purpose of this
study, the focus will be on excelling spreadsheet modelling.
To illustrate the Excel spreadsheet tool, a risk factor analysis is used.
The example in table 2.2 (only involves branch 1) focused on the
input data and the results, in an attempt to supply the reader with
more insight in the use and developing of a quantitative risk analysis
model (see figure 2.4).
Figure 2.4: Example factor risk analysis by using Excel
Source: Adapted format from Render et al (2003:11)
Hayes (2003:3) openly admits his addiction to Microsoft Excel. After
working with the tool for over ten years he decided to create a website
that offers free material and solutions for Excel spreadsheet users.
Researcher agrees with the latter author that spreadsheet modelling is
the only tool that is easy understandable and workable. The aim of this
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study will then be to develop a quantitative risk analysis model for
private security managers making use of a spreadsheet tool.
2.4.4 Qualitative versus quantitative approaches
According to Ozier (2003b:3) qualitative approaches are characterized by
subjective risk measures such as ordinal ranking (low risk or .3-value, medium
risk or value, and high risk or value) in a risk-to-value matrix. The qualitative
methods emerged in part from a persistent belief that it was simply too
difficult to get the real numbers. Also, qualitative approaches appealed to
management, which was looking for the “least-effort” way to prove they had
assessed their risks. After all, little attention has been paid to the results of risk
analysis and assessment until recently (Ozier 2003b:3).
In the researcher’s experience, and he agrees with Ozier (2003b: 3), qualitative
approaches, however otherwise encouraged, provide little basis for illustrating
the scale of risk in monetary terms or for making informed risk-management
decisions. The metrics of qualitative risk analysis do not reflect independently
objective values such as the monetary value of an asset, the annualised rate of
occurrence (frequency), the single loss exposure (impact), or the probability of
loss. Although these qualitative metrics can be useful to establish to
management that a problem exists, they can only address problems known by
the user to exist.
Quantitative approaches on the other hand, are characterized by the use of
independently objective measures for all risk metrics, including qualitative
risk-metric descriptors such as “information asset”, “threat”, “vulnerability”,
and “safeguard/ controls” nomenclatures (Ozier 2003b:3).
According to Ozier (2003b:4) asset values are also expressed in monetary
terms and threat frequency in annualised expressions that represent actual
expected frequency (e.g., 1/10 for once in 10 years, or 50/1 for 50 times per
year).
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Although the opinion of the researcher is already been expressed in paragraph
4 under point 2.6, it still remains that quantitative approaches can lead to a
reasonable result in prioritising and managing risk within a organization.
2.4.5 Example of how to develop a quantitative analysis model
Before a quantitative risk analysis model can be developed for security
managers, it is essential to note that there are many types of models that are
being used by analysts throughout the world. Some private companies and
insurance companies make use of their own quantitative analysis models. Most
of these models are solely based on the financial and engineering side. Some
other models that exist, which are known to the researcher, is that of
marketing, budgeting, transportation, facility and manufacturing models. In the
security discipline, and mainly on quantifying physical risks according to
different risk analysis concepts, no models exist which can be used as an
instrument or tool for the security manager.
To prick the interest of the reader, the following discussion will be focussing
on how to develop a quantitative analysis model.
It is important for the decision makers to involve a number of factors. For
example, if one are considering looking at theft or fraud in a company, factors
might include control measures, location and employees working in the
company.
Before we consider an example, we must start by listing the factors and their
relevant importance on a scale from 0 to 1.
A magazine distribution company has several branches spread all over the
country.
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The managing director aims to establish what the risk rating (high, medium or
low) is regarding the different branches. The managing director has
determined that the only three factors really important to him are control
measures, location and employees. Furthermore the managing director decided
that the location is the most important to him. He has given this a weight of
0.6. Employees are rated next with a weight of 0.3. Finally, the managing
director has given control measures an importance weight of 0.1. As with any
analysis of this kind, the importance weights for factors must sum to 1 (See
Table 2.2).
Table 2.2: Factor weights
FACTOR IMPORTANCE (WEIGHT)
Location 0.6
Employees 0.3
Control Measures 0.1
Source:  Own compilation
Three branches were identified as an example and numbered branches 1 to 3.
At this time the managing director feels comfortable with the factor weights.
Branch 1, location is given a weight of 0.7, employees an evaluation of 0.9
and control measures an evaluation of 0.6.
Branch 2 awarded a weight of 0.8 to location, 0.7 to employees and 0.8 to
control.
Branch 3 awarded a weight of 0.9 to location, 0.6 to employees and 0.9 to
control.
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The results are shown in table 2.3
Table 2.3: Factor evaluations
FACTOR BRANCH 1 BRANCH 2 BRANCH 3
Location   0.7  0.9   0.6
Employees   0.8  0.7   0.8
Control
Measures
  0.9  0.6   0.9
Source: Own compilation
Given this information, the managing director can determine a total weighted
evaluation for each of the variables. Each branch is given a factor evaluation
for the three factors, and then the factor weights are multiplied times the factor
evaluation and summed to get a total weighted evaluation for each branch. As
indicated in Table 2.4, branch 1 has received a total weighted evaluation of
0.75.
Table 2.4: Evaluation of branches
Branch
Number
Factor name Factor weight Factor evaluation Weighted
evaluation
  1 Location   0.6   x   0.7  =  0.42
Employees   0.3   x   0.8  =  0.24
Control Measures   0.1   x   0.9  =  0.09
Total   1  0.75
  2 Location   0.6   x   0.9  =  0.54
Employees   0.3   x   0.7  =  0.21
Control measures   0.1   x   0.6  =  0.06
Total   1  0.81
  3 Location   0.6   x   0.6  =  0.36
Employees   0.3   x   0.8  =  0.24
Control measures   0.1   x   0.9  =  0.09
Total   1  0.69
Source: Own compilation
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The same was done with Branch 2 who received a total weighted evaluation of
0.81. Regarding branch 3, the total weighted evaluation amounts to 0.69. The
managing director must now take a decision on the highest total, which in
effect means that the risk at branch 2 (0.81) is a high-risk area to operate in.
This example of a very simple model can not only be used by managers, but
also supervisors in the security industries to use as value-added services to
their clients where services are rendered.
The problem with this type of model is that the probability and impact factors
are not considered. It doesn’t deal with the probabilities of future occurrences
by analysing presently known probabilities.
Researcher undertakes in chapters 3 - 7 to develop and provide a quantitative
analysis model by using risk analysis concepts, which can easily be used by
security managers to identify and control risks within the organizational
environment.
2.4.6 Advantages of quantitative modelling
There are a number of advantages of mathematical modelling such as the
communication of problems and solutions to others. It can also save time and
money in decision-making and problem solving. Researcher will briefly
elaborate in this regard.
According to Render et al (2003:8-9) models can accurately present reality.
Wayne and Albright (1997:4) agree but only if it is properly formulated.
Models can help in the decision-making process. The decision maker can
formulate problems such as risks facing his company.
Models can give insight and information especially when using the probability
and impact in models. Models can also save time and money in decision-
making and problem solving. According to Render et al (2003:9) it usually
takes less time, effort and expense to analyze a model. To solve large or
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complex problems in a timely fashion, it may be the only solution. A large
company, for example, may literally experience high risks in the company,
such as employee theft and fraud. To get the quickest and highest results in
preventing such risks, a mathematical model may be the only option in
determining the best solution that a company can achieve under these
circumstances. Lastly, it can be said that the important advantage is to
communicate problems and solutions to others. Render et al (2003:9) are of the
opinion that a mathematical model can give direction to managers or
executives in helping them make the final decision in solving problems.
2.5 EDUCATION OF THE SECURITY MANAGER IN
QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS
The researcher established that no training in quantitative risk analysis exists for the
private security manager, both internationally15 and in South Africa.
According to Christman (2003b:4) training should be the key challenge. No longer
can security companies hire someone and put them on assignment with only a new
uniform and a pat on the back, especially when it’s a managerial position. The belief
of the public and organizational management is that giving private security personnel
better training will make them not only a more effective crime fighting entity in
future, but will enable them also to play a fundamental role in the total spectrum of
risk management. To Spencer (1997:4) good training is essential, when you train
people better, you also make an investment in them to get a higher return. The
problem is that training costs money and companies and neighbourhoods that are
hiring private security guards don’t want to spend money (Spencer 1997:4).
The researcher is of the opinion that money be invested in training, especially in the
training of private security managers, because a huge lack of training now exists,
especially in the field of quantitative risk analysis. It serves no need for managers to
be trained only in the general aspects of security but not being skilled in the total
process of risk analysis and the normal security survey activities. Part of a security
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manager’s profile should contain the analysis of risk in order for them to assist their
clients in the identifying of risk and the handling thereof. This can also be called a
value-added service towards their clients.
In the researcher’s own experience the modern private security manager should be
able to demonstrate the following competencies:
· Knowledge of risk management functions;
· Conduct security risk analysis;
· Computer literacy;
· Knowledge of Occupational Health and Safety;
· Investigative skills;
· Language and communication proficiency;
· Designing and implementing awareness policies;
· Marketing;
· Knowledge of labour relations in security context;
· Design and implementation of contingency plans; and
· Apply business principles on the supervisory level of security practices.
It is becoming more and more apparent that security personnel and more specifically,
security managers at all levels, need to have the necessary knowledge and skills to
properly accomplish their main duty, namely the protection of personnel, property and
assets.
The Private Security Industry Regulatory Act, Act 56 of 2001 is a legally established
body regulating all private security companies in South Africa. It must be noted that
from this legislation the Security Industry Regulatory Authority (SIRA) was born,
which now controls and regulates the private security industry. Such companies
therefore have to be registered with SIRA. Besides company registration, individual
registration is also compulsory. An important prerequisite is the training of security
officers. The general perception is that training, besides the actual security duty, is
without a doubt the most extensive task in the security industry. Unsubstantiated
                                                                                                                                                       
15 See schedules B and C
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information indicates that at any given time about 65% of all security personnel are
either being trained or are involved in the planning and presentation thereof.
However, the facts obtained during researcher’ interviews (See table  1.3), show that
training in the security industry does not put enough emphasis on risk analysis in its
curriculum, and it therefore impedes the objective of always ensuring the client of a
high service standard. According to Eberlein and Karsten (1998:14) evaluation is a
measurable standard, and can be viewed as feedback in order to implement the
necessary changes. It is particularly vital for the security industry to follow the steps
in the risk management process, namely risk identification, evaluation and
management.
Valsamakis et al (2000:26) highlight that risk evaluation and analysis require
specialist knowledge and techniques. The development of a risk analysis model
therefore means that special skills and knowledge for general use in handling risks
within an organizational context are required.
Risk analysis for the security industry in South Africa should therefore be one of the
cornerstones on which successful training is built.
Hassenzahl (2002:12) states that a major problem is faced regarding the way analysis
is used recently, keeping in mind how many well-developed methods and extensive
quantitative and qualitative techniques exist. Unfortunately, much risk analysis seems
to be handled quite badly due to a lack of knowledge and training in the field of risk
analysis. According to Wold and Shriver (1997:9) security is an increasing concern
and therefore it is of utmost importance that security managers be well educated in the
aspects of risk analysis.  Security managers should understand the following:
· How one can manipulate and critique a variety of risk analysis methods;
· How one can describe (quantitatively and qualitatively), manage and
communicate uncertainty; and
· How others will interpret and use risk analysis processes and outputs.
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Researcher agrees on what both authors are saying about education in this regard.
Training in risk analysis should start at the security management level because they
are the first line of defence in assisting their clients in the total spectrum of risk
management.  Risk analysis must therefore be the primary concern.
2.5.1 Involvement of security managers in quantitative risk analysis 
Before a discussion on this topic can commence, it is necessary to give some
statistics regarding registered security service providers in South Africa (See
Table 2.5).
Table 2.5: Registered service providers per region
Source:  Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority
GAUTENG 1,674
MPUMALANGA 337
EASTERN CAPE 309
WESTERN CAPE 647
NORTHERN PROVINCE 253
FREE STATE 189
NORTHERN CAPE 57
KWAZULU NATAL 790
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According to SIRA, there are 210,924 registered and active security officers.
Concerning inactive security officers the total amounts to 412,538.  This
brings the total active and inactive officers to 623,462.  It is also established
that there is no substantial evidence in proving how many private security
managers are part of the total figure of 623,462, but unconfirmed information
shows more or less a 12% of the total figure. It is therefore important that
approximately 12% of security managers be familiar with all aspects
concerning quantitative risk analysis and what it provides in the decision-
making process.
According to Broder (2002:2) the one major resource required for risk analysis
is trained manpower. During informal interviews with four of the twenty top
ranking registered security providers in South Africa (see table 2.5),
managers16 indicated that no formal training exists in quantitative risk
analysis.
During the researcher’s informal interviews with some of the managers, he
was especially shocked at the total absence of skills and knowledge regarding
quantitative analysis. Some of the top management in these major security
organizations is of the opinion that they are providers of a physical guard
service, which do not, include any form of risk analysis training.
According to the security managers, this is more of a financial nature and
security managers in general, are not financial professionals. Only a general
security survey is carried out on demand and where necessary (See schedule
D). If a need exists for a quantitative risk analysis, then they would rather call
for outside advice. 17
                                                
16 Informal interviews with some of the security managers indicated that they will provide information for this
research project only on condition that their personal particulars are treated as confidential.
17 Many companies call on outside consultants to perform studies, make evaluations, and offer
recommendations for implementing or improving security programs. (Broder 2000:219).
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Even though security managers are not involved in the analysis process, they
should be prepared to provide information assistance to those who might
conduct it.
According to the interviewed managers, most of time they don’t even know
which risks or deviations to look for on their client’s premises. One of the
security managers, whose name is kept confidential for the purpose of this
study, blames his top management for the lack of knowledge and training in
the analysis field.
Information obtained during the interviews reveals that top management do
not possesses the necessary skills to perform such an analysis and would
therefore be putting their professional reputation on the line in ever admitting
that they don’t have the skills or knowledge in using a quantitative risk
analysis model.
Taking the abovementioned discussion into consideration, the researcher is
now more than ever convinced that security managers need intensive training
on the whole subject of risk analysis.
According to the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authorities Training
Division in South Africa, student security courses and/or modules for
management (Grade A) don’t contain any aspects on the total spectrum of risk
analysis. In fact, no analysis courses from Grade A to Grade E are offered.
The subjects for Grade A mainly focus on the following aspects:
· Basic principles of investigation;
· Action at the scene of an incident;
· Questioning of witnesses;
· Principles of giving evidence;
· Courts and court procedures;
· Human behaviour;
· Motivation and gaining co-operation;
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· Report writing;
· Security registers;
· Interaction.
Enquiries at Technikon South Africa, also indicate that no subject on a
physical quantitative risk analysis model for the private security exists. The
division for security and safety management only focuses on the risk
management discipline.
The success of any risk analysis undertaking should be strongly dependent on
the role of top management in educating their managers. Taking this statement
into consideration, the researcher strongly believes that he can contribute
towards the development of an easy-to-use quantitative model in training the
whole top management.
2.6 PROFESSIONALISM OF THE PRIVATE SECURITY MANAGER
As stated earlier, in this discussion, rendering a service in quantitative risks analysis
for clients could not only add value to service but also sketch a portrait of
professionalism.
According to Van Heerden (in Du Preez 1994:4), professionalism is inter alia,
characterized by the following:
· Specialized knowledge and technical competency;
· Self discipline and self control;
· Commitment to an ideal of service;
· Peer group evaluation and peer group respect;
· Emotional neutrality (i.e. objectivity and stability);
· Clearly demarcated and permanent membership;
· General acceptance by the public that the occupation is in fact a profession.
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Van Heerden (in Du Preez 1994:4) further contends that the security officer must
satisfy some of the following requirements that are determinants of professionalism:
· Recognized professional status roles. Attaining a distinguished position which is
recognized and respected by the community, employees and colleagues;
· Power.  The ability/authority/competence to perform a professional task and to
gain the desired result, regardless of the stumbling blocks;
· Skill.  The capacity to perform difficult tasks;
· Responsibility. The responsibility for actions recognizes the accountability of the
person concerned;
· Objectivity. A certain attitude projected by a member of profession who executes
this task correctly, calmly, purposefully and in an unbiased way and does not
allow external factors to influence own judgment;
Taking Van Heerden (in Du Preez’s 1994:4) view about professionalism into
consideration, it indicates that security managers should have a widespread of
knowledge of security problems and how to handle them professionally. One way of
doing this is that the security manager must be in a position to conduct a risk
reduction analysis and to advise clients on various options to secure assets.
It is the researcher’s view that the private security managers can contribute the same
level of professionalism as their peers in various disciplines, such as human resource,
legal, financial, and marketing managers.
2.7 LEGISLATIVE CONCERNS FOR PRIVATE SECURITY AND
RISK ANALYSIS
Due to the booming  of the private security industry in South Africa (researcher’s own
view) and the recognition by the state that it was performing duties, which was
previously the responsibility of the state police a need arose to regulate the industry.
In 1987, legislation in the form of the Security Officers Act (Act 92 of 1987) was
passed by Parliament, which would regulate the private security industry in South
Africa, which then allowed for the establishment of the Security Officers Board.
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Thereafter in 1997 the legislation was amended and the Security Officers Amendment
Act of  104 of 1997 was passed. The amendment provided for the establishment of an
Interim Security Officers Board, which replaced the former SOB that was made up of
people with vested interest in the industry.
The amendment of the 1987 Act (Act 92 of 1987) and the appointment of an interim
SOB has to be seen against the background of problems experienced by the old SOB.
The industry was plagued by infighting and allegations of nepotism and corruption.
The Security Officers Amendment Act of 104 of 1997, stipulated the appointment of
an interim SOB and tasked the Minister for Safety and Security with drafting
legislation within a period of eighteen months for the purpose of evaluating current
regulation of the industry, and suggesting a new regulatory framework, where
appropriate. Further more, the interim board is mandated to conduct an internal
review of the regulatory affairs of the board such as, inter-alia, administration and
staffing, and submit recommendations to the Minister of Safety and Security for his
consideration. Some of the main functions of the board are:
· Registration and maintenance of a computerized data base consisting of all
registered security officers and security businesses;
· Fingerprint classification;
· Setting training standards;
· Inspection and prosecution of security businesses breaking the law;
· Drafting of legislation and amendments of the Security Officers Act.
Without proper regulation there will be chaos in the security industry, which could
interfere and/or damage the rights and interests of the public, employee security
officers and law-abiding security businesses will not be sufficient protected.
Further tightened regulatory measures were implemented with the commencing of the
new, so-called “PSIRA” Act, that was passed on 14 February 2001.  This is called the
Private Security Industry Regulation Act, 2001 (Act No. 56 of 2001).
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This Act now places the emphasis on the following aspects:
· The scope of regulation (who and what will be regulated);
· The nature and scope of the body that will direct regulation (who will regulate);
· The exact principles and methods to be used in regulating the industry in future
(how regulation will work in practice).
Besides the abovementioned legal concerns for the private security industry, one of
the most commonly asked questions regarding the analysis process within companies
surrounds its legal enforceability.  Although the King II guidelines on corporate
governance  focuses mainly  on operational risks,  it is researcher’s view that physical
risks also requires a system that is embedded in the operations of the organization and
is capable of the kind of response that provides accurate root cause risk analysis. The
King II report is not legislation and as such does not have the binding effect of
legislation. The report is in essence a code, designed to give guidelines for good
corporate governance (King 1994:1).
The Company Act, Act 61 of 1973 governs all companies. The Act contains various
sections that fall within those requirements contained in the report. One section is the
management function, which automatically includes risk management18. The analysis
process forms part of any management function and is therefore necessary in
developing a successful growing business. The emphasis is placed on “any
management” which includes security management.
 Contractors Regulations as per Government Notice 25207 of 2003 now also place the
emphasis on risk analysis19.  Regulation 7 (1) state clearly that every contractor
performing construction work shall, before commencement of any construction work
and during construction work, cause a risk assessment to be performed by a
                                                
18 Risk Management process entails the planning, arranging and controlling of activities and resources to
minimize the impacts of all risks. (King 1994:97). This means that risk analysis should form part of the overall
planning process within companies.
19 According to  Government Notice 25207 of 18th July 2003, risk analysis is defined as a program which
determine any risk associated with any hazard at a construction site, in order to identify the steps needed to be
taken to remove, reduce or control such hazard.
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competent person appointed in writing and the risk analysis shall form part of the
health and safety plan to be applied on the site and shall include at least:
· The identification of the risk and hazards to which persons may be exposed to;
· The analysis and evaluation of risks and hazards identified;
· A documented plan of safe work procedures to mitigate, reduce or control the
risks and hazards that have been identified;
· A monitoring plan; and
· A review plan.
Regarding the above discussion it is clear that the private security manager has a
fundamental role to fulfil in the total spectrum of security, risk management and risk
analysis, which is legally driven.
2.8 THE FUTURE OF THE PRIVATE SECURITY AND
QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS
Private security has come a long way. Developments in governmental regulations
have resulted in restructuring of the Industry and standards to create improvements in
the quality of personnel, education and training needed to promote a positive view of
the private security industry.
The researcher estimates that the average annual rate of growth of the private security
industry’s personnel to the year 2010 will be approximately 7% per year. The reason
for this viewpoint is that (i) companies focussing on the outsourcing of departments
that is not the core business of a their companies, such as in house security (ii)
concern that businesses may be vulnerable to crime (iii) a need to comply with new
mandates from insurance companies and (iv) a desire to have the kind of 24 hour
presence that police officers don’t have time to devote to one particular business or
neighbourhood. One can quickly realize the potential available for an individual
thinking of a career in the private security industry (Hall 2003:5).
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For the management of the private security industry, it is essential that managers not
only be educated in the general aspects of security, but also in the risk analysis
process, as this forms part of any management function (see point 2.12).  Tools, such
as, the “TIQCAM” model (see point 7.1 and footnote 18) can be used with great
success to expose physical vulnerabilities. We have to remember that we cannot be
lax in security by just patching what we think is wrong. A tool such as the
“TIQCAM” model reminds us that we sometimes need to view things from another
angle, such as, the quantifying of risk, in order to present the full picture to our
clients.
Although quantitative risk analysis for the private security industry is not a primary
issue, it will not only expand in the near future and encourage the private security
manager to be better educated in risk analysis, but will also boost the professional
image of the whole private security industry.
 It is also the researcher’s view that the in-house security managers will also benefit
from the use of a quantitative risk analysis model in the future.
2.9 CONCLUSION
The private security industry continues to grow with the demand for more guards,
which also means the possible promotion of some of these guards to positions such as
managers. This is where private security providers need to dedicate themselves and
their managers to education regarding quantitative risk analysis, by using a suitable
model. This will not only label them as professional private security providers but will
also lead to the decreasing of risks.
From the aforementioned discussion, the following chapter will focus solely on the
steps in developing a quantitative risk analysis model for the private security
manager.
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3 CHAPTER 3
THE PROBABILITY CONCEPT WITHIN THE RISK ANALYSIS
APPROACH
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Private security managers are involved in the day-to-day security risk quantification
and therefore will not be fully acquainted in dealing with the different concepts in risk
analysis. Their roles are primarily based on the identification of risk and the
implementation of suitable control measures.
The purpose of this chapter is to expose the private security manager to the first
concept, “probability”. Understanding this concept will not only help the security
manager, but also decision makers in choosing wisely under conditions of uncertainty.
Probability is the language of uncertainty (Schuyler 2001:141).
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According to Render et al (2003:78) the successes or failures that persons experience
in life depend on the decisions that they make. Risk communication20 characterizes
and presents information about security risks and uncertainties to decision-makers.
The quantification of any risk is mainly based on three types of concepts (probability,
impact and cost of risk) used in determining the outcome or seriousness of that risk.
For this discussion, the focus will be on the probability concept.
3.2 PROBABILITY CONCEPT AND APPLICATION
A brief discussion on the probability concept clarification was presented under point
1.6.6 with the aim of attracting the interest of the reader.  Although much could be
written and said about this concept, this discussion will be of a more focussed nature
regarding the application in quantifying risk. For the purpose of introducing
“probability”, the researcher is of the opinion that only the following aspects are
important and applicable to this study.
3.2.1 A short history of probability
Apostol (1969:1) drew the attention to gambler’s dispute in 1654 that led to
the creation of a mathematical theory of probability by two famous French
mathematicians, Blaise Pascal and Pierre de Fermat.
Chevelier de Méré, a French nobleman with an interest in gaming and
gambling questions, called Pascal’s attention to an apparent contradiction
concerning a popular dice game. The game consisted of throwing a pair of
dice 24 times; the problem was to decide whether or not to bet even money on
the occurrence of at least one “double six” during the 24 throws. A seemingly
well-established gambling rule led De Méré to believe that betting on a double
                                                
20 The word communication is derived from Latin “communicare”, meaning common, to share, indicating a
process having joint action as its purpose.  To communicate with somebody is a complex process where many
factors influence the outcome (Reksness 2003:1).
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six in 24 throws would be profitable, but his own calculations indicated just
the opposite.
This problem and others posed by De Méré led to an exchange of letters
between Pascal and Fermat in which fundamental principles of probability
theory were formulated for the first time. Although some Italian
mathematician had solved a few special problems on games of chance in the
15th and 16th centuries, no general theory was developed before this famous
correspondence.
Since then the ideas have been refined somewhat and probability theory is
now part of a more general discipline known as the measure theory.
3.2.2 Types of probabilities
Where do probabilities come from? According to Render et al (2003:36)
sometimes they are subjective and based on personal experiences. Other times
they are objectively based on logical observations such as the roll of a dice.
Often, probabilities are also derived from historical data.
· Objective approach
The following objective approach by Glosser (1999:1) is based on the fact
that the study of probability helps us figure out the likelihood of something
happening. For instance, a spinner has 4 sectors coloured yellow, blue,
green and red. What are the chances of landing on blue after spinning the
spinner?
The chances of landing on blue are 1 in 4, or one fourth. The problem in
Glosser’s (1999:1) theory was to find the probability that the spinner will
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land on blue. Table 3.1 highlights the definitions and examples from the
problem.
Table 3.1: Definitions and examples
Definition Example
An experiment is a situation involving chance
or probability that leads to results called
outcomes
The experiment is spinning the
wheel
An outcome is the result of a single trial of an
experiment
The possible outcomes are
landing on yellow, blue, green
occurred
An event is one or more outcomes of an
experiment
The event being measured is
landing on blue
Probability is the measure of how likely an
event is
The probability of landing on
blue is one fourth
Source:  Glosser (1999:1)
In order to measure probabilities, mathematicians have devised the
following formula for finding the probability of an event (see table 3.2).
Table 3.2: Formula for finding probability of event
Source:  Glosser (1999:1)
The probability of event A is the number of ways event A can occur
divided by the total number of possible outcomes.  According to Glosser
(1999:2) a slight modification of the problem is as follows:
      Probability of an event
P (A) = The number of ways event can occur
   The total number of possible outcomes
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Experiment:
A spinner has 4 equal sectors coloured yellow, blue, green and red. After
spinning the spinner, what is the probability of landing on each colour?
Outcomes:
The possible outcomes of this experiment are yellow, blue, green and red.
Probabilities:
 P (Yellow)= number of ways to land on yellow = 1
           total number of colours    4
(Blue) =  number of ways to land on blue = 1
        total number of colours    4
(Green)  = number of ways to land on green = 1
          total number of colours 4
(Red)  = number of ways to land on red = 1
        total number of colours     4
Taking the above simple example into consideration, the probability of
occurrences can be expressed as a fraction or a decimal from 0-1.21
Therefore a basic understanding of probability makes it possible to
understand everything from the weather report averages to your chances of
being struck by lighting, or in the contemporary situation in South Africa,
being a victim of hi-jacking. Probability is an important topic for
mathematics because the probability of certain events happening or not
happening can be as important to them as in the real business world.
· Subjective approach
                                                
21  See chapter 1 (point 1.6.6)
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When logic and history are not appropriate, probability values can be
assessed subjectively. According to Render et al (2003:36), the accuracy of
subjective probabilities depends on the experience and judgment of the
person making the estimates. A number of probability values cannot be
determined unless the subjective approach is used. What is the probability
that crime will be severe in 2010? What is the probability that you will be
president of a major corporation in five years? (Mun 2002:2).
There are several methods for making subjective probability analysis
according to Render et al (2003:36). Opinion poles can be used to help in
determining subjective probabilities for possible election returns and
potential political candidates. In some cases, experience and judgment
must be used in making subjective analysis of probability values (Render
et al 2003:36).
3.2.3 Risk Matrix
Martin and Tate’s (2002:6) perception of risk matrix is a table used to assign a
“score” to the identified risk, to assist with the risk management process. In
fact, it is the core of the risk management documentation. For each risk
identified, a score is assigned for the probability and impact22 aspects.
Often a range of 1-5 is used for each aspect. Different organizations use
different ratings. To Render et al (2003:34) the rules regarding the probability
rating is 0-1 (see point 1.6.6).
Concerning the ratings of probability, some authors, Render et al (2003:34),
Wayne and Albright (1997:499) and Martin and Tate (2002:2) share the same
view but with a slight difference in expressions. For the purpose of this
                                                
22 See discussion of impact risk ratings in Chapter 4.
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discussion, the researcher will abide by the latter view which are given below
in table 3.3:
Table 3.3: Probability risk rating
 Source: Martin and Tate (2002:2)
Probability
rating
Level of
probability
Definition
Zero Zero No chance that the risk will occur
.1 Very low Probability that this event will occur is between 1-
20%
.3 Low Probability that this event will occur is between 21-
40%
.5 Medium Probability that this event will occur is between 41-
60%
.7 High Probability that this event will occur is between 61-
80%
.9 Very high Probability that this event will occur is between 81-
99%
1.0 Certainty If the probability of occurrence is 100% then that
means it is not a risk but an assumption
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Mun (2000:3) states that a risk management integrated team typically
completes a risk matrix. The approach for such a team before commencing in
rating the probability of any event is as follows:
· List every risk identified;
· For each risk, estimate probability and impact;
· Calculate overall rating (probability and impact);
· Identify detailed risk mitigation (reduction) strategies;
· Optionally, estimate “net” risk rating (after allowing for effect of
mitigation strategy.
A risk management integrated team should include risk management
specialists such as a risk manager (in some instances also known as the
security manager) or a risk analyst consultant.  Businesses normally direct the
risk issues to their risk management and or risk control department. This is
where the security manager and or risk manager must know the full spectrum
of the risk analysis approach (see figure 1.1.). A discussion on the risk analysis
approach is vital in understanding that quantitative approach consist of
concepts which must be taken into consideration such as the probability
concept.
3.3 DEVELOPMENT OF THE “TIQCAM” MODEL
The “TIQCAM” model (researcher’s own design) starts of with a risk problem, which
will lead to the commencement of a quantitative risk analysis.  In doing a risk analysis
the analyst should take all the different concepts into consideration.  These concepts
have their own criteria, which are important in the analysing process to come to a
positive result regarding the risk problem.
These concepts are illustrated in figure 1.1 which follows the following steps:
· Step 1: Probability
· Step 2: Impact
· Step 3: Cost factor
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· Step 4: Degree of correction
· Step 5: Human factor
After all the steps are taken into consideration, it will then reflect the risk subtotal and
the risk total where after a risk classification will be established. This classification
plays a fundamental role in the whole analysing process because it will then
determine if future action is needed. This also means that the future action must then
be taken into consideration for decision-making purposes in solving the risk problem.
The future action is thus illustrated in figure 1.1 with a red connection line to place
the emphasis on the importance in solving the risk problem.
For example, the following discussion regarding the different steps in the approach to
developing of the foresaid model, researcher will stick to the use of a magazine
distribution company as used under point 2.3.5. Furthermore, the researcher will only
use two physical risk problems, namely robbery and fraud –which is a sensible
approach because they (the risks) probably represent the gambit of speculative risks to
any enterprise : violence and stealth, as an example to establish the end result of that
risk problem, bearing in mind that in developing this model, the researcher is going to
use hypothetical ratings which will be assigned to the two foresaid risk problems in
order to come to the risk classification. This will give the reader a better insight in
how to use the model in a practical way.
3.3.1 Integrating the probability concept as step one (1) in the development
process
With reference to point 1.6.6, the researcher is of the opinion that the
probability concept plays an important role in the starting point of this model
development. It must also be clearly understood that although there can be
written and debated widely concerning this concept, this model development
is an “easy-to-use” model for private security industry and might easily be
used by some other disciplines in the business world.
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With reference to the concept “probability”, three aspects are taken into
consideration, namely the criteria aspects, risk indicator and the risk rating.
3.3.1.1 Criteria
Although analysts use different criteria, the following is applicable
for the purpose of this study.
· Event will occur is between 81% and 100%
· Event will occur is between 61% and 80%
· Event will occur is between 41% and 60%
· Event will occur is between 21% and 40%
· Event will occur is between 1% and 20%
3.3.1.2 Risk indicator
To establish what the risk indicators are in relation to the different
foresaid criteria; it is necessary to reflect it towards these different
criteria.
Criteria   Risk indicator
· Event will occur between 81% and 100% Certainty
· Event will occur between 61% and 80% High
· Event will occur between 41% and 60% Medium
· Event will occur between 21% and 40% Low
· Event will occur between 1% and 20% Very low
3.3.1.3 Risk rating
It is important that every risk indicator must have a risk rating in
order to come to a positive rating of the risk problem.
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Risk indicator Risk rating
· Certainty 1.0
· High .7
· Medium .5
· Low .3
· Very low .1
It is now necessary to combine the probability concept aspects in
table form as illustrated in table 3.4.  As mentioned earlier on,
hypothetical ratings are being used.
Table 3.4: Combined illustration of probability aspects
Source: Own compilation
3.4 CONCLUSION
This chapter outlined the importance of the probability concept as the first step in the
developing of a quantitative analysis model.  Security managers must always bear in
mind that they can do a lot with probabilities. It also gives a solid foundation on
which the manager may base his recommendations for corrective actions. Probability
is thus the language of uncertainty and is very important in the decision making
process (Schuyler 2001:141).
Risk problem Criteria Risk indicator Risk rating
Robbery Event will occur between 41%
and 60%
Medium .5
Fraud Event will occur between 81%
and 100%
Certainty 1.0
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From the abovementioned discussion, the following chapter will not only address the
second step in the “TIQCAM” model approach, namely the impact concept, but will
also involve a joined Excel formulation with the probability concept.  The same
strategy will be applied to all the concept chapters that will follow. The idea is to ease
the discussion to the end (Chapters 3 to 7) to totally complete the development of the
“TIQCAM” model in chapter 7, by reaching an exact risk classification regarding the
risk problem as indicated in table 3.4.
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4 CHAPTER 4
INTEGRATIVE APPROACH OF THE IMPACT CONCEPT IN
BUSINESS IMPACT ANALYSIS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In this discussion the impact concept forms part of step two (2) as illustrated in figure
1.1.  This concept plays a vital role in the risk analysis process and, according to the
researcher, is built on two main pillars, namely: sensitivity23 and severity24. These two
elements will each have their own criteria, risk indicators and values when discussing
it as part of the development of the model under point 4.4.
The major risk in South Africa is crime, which has a tremendous impact on the whole
of South Africa’s citizenry. Businesses are also touched by the high rate of crime and
therefore must lower the risk by impact analysis.
This chapter aims to elaborate more on the impact concept clarification as mentioned
in chapter one (point 1.6.9) to enable the security manager to understand the bigger
picture. It will also address the fact that the impact concept can not function in
isolation. The other concepts, such as probability, will also play a vital role in the
outcome of the end result in developing the “TIQCAM” model.
4.2 CLARIFICATION OF THE CONCEPT IMPACT
In Chapter one under point 1.6.9, the impact concept was briefly discussed with the
aim to lay the foundation or basis for deeper analysis.  Bearing in mind the different
                                                
23 According to the Pharos  Dictionary, sensitivity can be defined as the quality or state of being sensitive. It can
also be the ability to respond to physical stimuli or to register small physical amounts. Also a state which can
course embarrassment
24 Situation of seriousness according to the Pharos Dictionary.
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views of authors concerning the business impact analysis (BIA), it will then be safe to
define impact of disruption over time and assist in the understanding of the amount of
risk to assume, transfer or mitigate. A common question normally asked by security
managers and business continuity planners are: How much reduction in premium can
we expect from our insurance company if risk control programs are in place? The
answer is usually not much, especially when compared to the probable maximum loss,
which can be avoided if the appropriate programs and resulting mitigations are in
place (Kruger 2003:3).
According to Broder (2000:108) a risk analysis and a business impact analysis can
greatly reduce the cost of insurance by identifying and quantifying a potential loss,
thereby allowing the security manager to avoid over or underinsuring the risk.
Broder (2000:108) is further of the opinion that BIA will allow management to make
timely decisions about future business issues, and it will help the organization avoid a
less than speedy recovery.
Broder (2000:108) strongly places the emphasis on the BIA, which will help to:
· Identify which processes and computer applications are critical to the survival of
the organization;
· Establish the value of each business unit as it relates to the whole, not to itself;
· Identify critical resources of the organization;
· Gain support for the recovery process from senior management;
· Increase management’s awareness of the issues and resources required for a
workable program, as well as introduce a basic planning structure to the
management group;
· Potentially reveal inefficiencies in normal operations;
· Help to justify or allocate better recovery planning budgets (cost/benefit).
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4.3 INTERACTION BETWEEN THE IMPACT AND PROBABILITY
CONCEPTS
The researcher is of the opinion that to achieve the most accurate risk-rating outcome,
the impact concept in any risk analysis cannot be seen in isolation. The probability
rating also plays a vital role in establishing the correct measurement in the analysis
process. You should then consider the risk rating as being:
The impact x the probability
The researcher’s perception is also that there is no standard way of measuring the
impact or probability of a risk.  It is up to the risk and/or security practitioner to
consider and prioritise this risk in his own manner.
Martin and Tate (2002:3) use a risk analysis matrix (see table 4.1) to enter the rating
for the probability (P) of the risk occurring in the “P” column. Consider how likely it
is that this risk will happen in terms of the specific nature and context of the project.
Table 4.1: Risk Analysis Matrix
Potential
risks
Probability
/ Impact ratio
Controls / Risk
mitigation
P
I
 P x I
Source: Martin and Tate (2002: 5)
Record the rating of the impact (I) of the risk should it occur in column “I” on the
matrix. This enables analysis of the effect this risk will have if it occurs on the
achievement of the aims and objectives of the project according to Martin and Tate
(2002:3).
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To calculate the impact/probability ratio (PI), multiply the scores in each column
(P x I) to combine the likelihood of the risk occurring with the consequence.  The
score is rated on a scale of 0-10 with 0 being the lowest probability/impact (PI) ratio.
Therefore the highest PI ratio score possible is 1 (Martin & Tate 2002:3).
Identified potential risks should be analysed, with a tentative indication of the
significance of each risk (clearly significant; PI score above 7.5, possible significant;
PI score above 5.5, and probably insignificant; PI score under 3.5) and inter-
relationships between risks.  A sample of an impact risk-rating is shown in table 4.2
below.
Martin and Tate (2002; 3) state further that if a risk is related to one or more other
risks, in the sense that they share common causes or for other reasons, the occurrence
of one affects the likelihood of another, the related risks should be evaluated together.
The resulting analysis of each risk or group of related risks should be entered in the
risk matrix.
The significance of risks should be reviewed and then they should be reclassified into
the categories of significance. For risks, which are probably insignificant (i.e. low
score on PI ratio), the decision must be made as to whether they can be ignored or not
according to Martin and Tate (2002:3).
Table 4.2 Impact risk rating
Impact rating Level of impact Meaning
0 (Zero) 0 (Zero) There is no impact if the risk should occur.
Therefore, it’s not truly a risk
1.5 Very low The impact is minor
3.5 Low The impact is minor but would be noticed by the
customer, and would create minor customer
dissatisfaction
5.5 Medium The impact on the company or project is not
insignificant and would create dissatisfaction.
7.5 High The impact is significant and would create major
dissatisfaction. It could jeopardize the company
or the project.
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9.5 Very High The impact is catastrophic and would kill the
project.
Source: Martin and Tate (2002:2)
Particular attention and care must be taken in identifying and classifying risks that
could have either:
· Serious or catastrophic consequences or high expected values; or
· Exceptionally favourable consequences.
All the risks in both of these categories are likely to need particular, individual
attention when analysing the overall “riskiness”. A decision must be made about
which risks are amenable to more detailed evaluation and quantification (Martin &
Tate 2002:4).
4.4 INTEGRATING THE IMPACT CONCEPT AS PART OF THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE “TIQCAM” MODEL
Risk impact, as the second step (see figure 1.1) in the developing of the “TIQCAM “
model, plays a vital role in the quantitative risk analysis process and, according to the
researcher, is built on two main pillars, namely: sensitivity and severity. These two
elements will each have their own criteria, risk indicators and values.
4.4.1 Sensitivity
The focus here is on outside factors such as the media, public and local
concern as described in the criteria below. Media propaganda can have a great
and sometimes negative impact on the business environment when accidents
occur.
Criteria
· Media event, immediate broad concern
· Media event
· Local concern
96
· Public concern
· No public concern
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Risk indicator
To establish what the risk indicators are regarding the different
aforementioned criteria, it is necessary to reflect it towards the different
criteria as stipulated below.
Criteria  Risk indicator
Media event, immediate broad concern Catastrophic
Media event Major
Local concern Moderate
Public concern Minor
No public concern Insignificant
Risk rating
It is important that every risk indicator must have a risk rating in order to
come to a positive rating of the risk problem.
Risk indicator Risk rating
Catastrophic 5
Major 4
Moderate 3
Minor 2
Insignificant 1
4.4.2 Severity
The following criteria are applicable to the term severity.
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Criteria
· Multiple deaths, or damages over R6 000 000
· Single death or multiple injuries or damages between R4 000 000 and
R5 000 000
· Individual injuries, loss or damages R3 000 000
· First aid, loss or damages R2 000 000
· No injuries and/or minor loss and damages
Risk indicator
To establish what the risk indicators are regarding the different foresaid
criteria, it is necessary to reflect it towards the different criteria as stipulated
below.
Criteria  Risk indicator
Multiple deaths, or damages over R6 000 000  Catastrophic
 Single death or multiple injuries or damages Major
 between R4 000 000 and R5 000 000
Individual injuries loss or damages R3 000 000 Moderate
First aid, loss or damages R2 000 000 Minor
No injuries and or minor loss and damages               Insignificant
Risk rating
It is important that every risk indicator must have a risk rating in order to
come to a positive rating of the risk problem.
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Risk indicator     Risk rating
Catastrophic    5
Major  4
Moderate 3
Minor  2
Insignificant 1
Putting the abovementioned discussion in perspective, the sensitivity and severity
aspects of the impact concept forms part of a combination illustration as per table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Combined illustration of risk impact aspects
Source: Own compilation
4.5 JOINED PROBABILITY AND IMPACT CONCEPTS IN EXCEL
FORMAT
It is important that the concepts as per tables 3.4 and 4.3 now be illustrated in Excel
spreadsheet format as suggested in chapter 1 under point 1.6.3. The foresaid concepts
in tables 3.4 and 4.3 are joined together in order to give the reader a better picture of
the model appearance so far (see figure 4.1).
SENSITIVITY SEVERITY
Risk
problem
Criteria Risk
indicator
Risk
rating
Criteria Risk
indicator
Risk rating
Robbery Media
event
Major 4 First aid, loss
or damages
R2 000 000
Minor 2
Fraud Public
concern
Minor 2 Individual
injuries, loss
or damages R3
000 000
Moderate 3
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Figure 4.1: Probability and impact concepts joined in Excel format
Source: Own compilation
4.6 CONCLUSION
Taking the abovementioned discussion into consideration, it is clear that the impact
and the probability concepts are not enough to really participate in the exact
quantitative outcome of a risk problem. To achieve a high level of reliability and also
to strengthen the development of the “TIQCAM” model, it is necessary to integrate
the cost factor concept in this process. The latter concept can support a solid basis
upon which decisions can be based.
The following chapter will address the cost factor concept as step three in the
“TIQCAM” model as illustrated in figure 1.1.
101
5 CHAPTER 5
ESSENTIALITY OF THE COST FACTOR IN RISK MEASURING
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The cost factor can be considered as the essential and dynamic part of the risk
analysis process.  Costs of high risk can have a definite impact on an organisation’s
growth and development. The cost factor must therefore also integrate the degree of
correction concept (see chapter 6) in lowering the costs of risk by means of
implementing some protection measures.
Attention will be given in this chapter to the cost factor and its application. Thereafter
the development of the “TIQCAM” model comes under the loop with the cost factor
integrated with the concepts, probability and impact. Lastly, joined concept
illustration in Excel format involving the cost factor concept will be presented.
5.2 COST FACTOR CONCEPT AND APPLICATION
In the introduction to this chapter it was said that it is essential for the private security
manager to bear in mind that cost of threats can in some instances be more expensive
than the value of an asset. It is therefore of utmost importance to quantify the threats
and/or risks in an attempt to find the most cost effective measures of protecting the
company’s assets.
To do this, it is important to identify which threats will be dealt with and how.
According to Shimonski (2002:3) decisions will need to be made by management as
to how to proceed, based on the data that is collected regarding the risks. In most
cases, this will involve devising methods of protecting the asset from threats. This
may involve installing security software, implementing policies and procedures, or
adding additional security measures to protect the asset.
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Shimonski (2002:3) is further of the opinion that one may decide that the risks
involved in an asset are too high, and the cost to protect it are too high as well. In such
cases, the asset should be moved to another location, or eliminated completely. For
example, if there is a concern about a Web server affected by vibrations from
earthquakes in California, then moving the Web server to the branch office in New
York nullifies the threat. By removing the asset, you subsequently eliminate the threat
of it being damaged or destroyed (Shimonski 2002:3).
The researcher agrees with Shimonski (2002:3), but is of the opinion that transferring
the loss to another party, such as the insurance companies, the company can also
benefit in a way by not being solely responsible for an asset loss. When a loss occurs,
the company can be reimbursed. Leasing equipment can also be an additional option
in that the responsibility of cost is transferred to the leasing company to replace or
fixing assets involved.
As in the case of the risk ratings for the probability and impact concepts, it is also
necessary to indicate the score of “cost of risk” by means of a cost of risk rating. Fine
(1991:80)  indicates that the only way to determine whether proposed corrective
action to alleviate a risk situation is justified, the estimated cost of the corrective
measures is balanced or weighed against the degree of risk. Integrating two additional
factors into the risk score formula as follows does this:
Justification = Cost Factor x Degree of Correction
The cost factor according to Fine (1991:80) is a measure of the estimated dollar cost
of the proposed corrective action (see table 5.1).
Although the researcher agrees with Fine (1991:80) on his two additional concepts, it
appears that he only multiplied the cost of risk and degree of correction and then came
to a probable score which then indicates that a risk is high, medium or low.
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Table 5.1: Cost of risk rating in Dollars
Cost Rating
Over 50 000 dollar 10
25 000 to 50 000 dollars 6
10 000 to 25 000 dollars 4
1 000 to 10 000 dollars 3
100 to 1 000 dollars 2
25 to 100 dollars 1
Under 25 dollars 0.5
Source: Fine (1991:80)
If one looks at Fine’s (1991:80) justification formula which divides the Impact x
Probability by the Cost of Risk x Degree of Correction, it should also make provision
to subtract the Degree of Correction from the Cost of Risk, in setting a more reliable
risk score for decision making purposes, which is not the case in Fine’s (1991:80)
description of his model.
In the researcher’s development of a quantitative risk analysis model (see chapter 7)
he also based his formula on Fine’s principle (1991:80) but with a difference in the
risk rating. Fine (1991:80) rated his highest score on 10 with the lowest score as 0.5,
whilst the researcher’s scores are rated on a scale between 1-5 (See table 5.2).
Table 5.2: Cost of risk rating in Rand
Cost Value
Loss more than R 8 000 000 5
Loss between R 6 000 000 to R 8 000 000 4
Loss between R 4 000 000 to R 6 000 000 3
Loss between R 1 000 000 to R 3 000 000 2
Loss under R1 000 000 1
Source: Own compilation
The reason for the difference in risk ratings as per tables 5.1 and 5.2 is that authors,
such as Martin and Tate, Render et al, and Wayne and Albright also differ when it
comes to the calculation of risks. In the researcher’s view, risk ratings are not always
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exact, but at least gives a clear indication to the companies’ executives of how serious
their risks must be before giving their full attention to mitigating them.
5.3 INTEGRATING THE COST FACTOR CONCEPT AS PART OF
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE “TIQCAM” MODEL
The approach regarding the cost factor as step 3 in the development process, is to
determine the financial loss a company could experience due to its risk situation. This
is accomplished by looking at the criteria, risk indicator and the risk rating.
5.3.1 Cost Criteria
The following criteria are applicable as follows:
· Loss more than R8 000 000
· Loss between R6 000 000 and R8 000 000
· Loss between R4 000 000 and R6 000 000
· Loss between R 1 000 000 and R3 000 000
· Loss under R1 000 000
5.3.2 Cost Risk Indicator
The cost risk indicator will be reflected according to the cost criteria.
Cost Criteria Cost Risk Indicator
· Loss more than R8 000 000 Certainty
· Loss between R6 000 000 and R8 000 000 High
· Loss between R4 000 000 and R6 000 000 Medium
· Loss between R 1 000 000 and R3 000 000 Low
· Loss under R1 000 000 Very low
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Cost Risk Rating
It is important that every risk indicator must have a risk rating in order to come to
positive rating of the risk problem.
Cost Risk Indicator Cost Risk Rating
Certainty 5
High 4
Medium 3
Low 2
Very low 1
It is necessary to combine the cost factor concept aspects in table form as illustrated in
table 5.3.
Table 5.3: Combined illustration of the cost factor aspects
Risk
problem
Cost criteria Cost risk
indicator
Cost risk rating
Robbery Loss under
R1 00 000
Very low  1
Fraud Loss between
R4 000 000 and
R6 000 000
Medium  3
Source:  Own compilation
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5.4 JOINED COST FACTOR, IMPACT AND PROBABILITY
CONCEPTS IN EXCEL FORMAT
The cost factor concept as indicated in table 5.3 is joined with the impact and
probability concepts as reflected in figure 5.1 below.
Figure 5.1 : Cost factor concept joined in Excel format
Source: Own compilation
5.5 CONCLUSION
For any company executive, the financial implications regarding any risk situation are
of utmost importance. Quantitative risk analysis can be a helpful tool in accurately
establishing the cost of risk, taking the degree of correction (physical protection
measures) into consideration.
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In researcher’s earlier discussion (point 5.2) it seems that, as in the case of the
probability and impact concepts that the cost factor can also not function in isolation.
The cost of any risk should be weighed against the degree of correctional steps that
might already be implemented in a company.
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6 CHAPTER 6
DEGREE OF CORRECTION AS A MITIGATIONAL CONCEPT IN
THE ANALYSIS PROCESS
6.1 INTRODUCTION
As step four in the analysis, the degree of correction plays a fundamental role in
achieving the most accurate risk rating outcome in developing the “TIQCAM” model
This concept mainly focuses on the mitigation aspect in the risk analysis process by
taking all the necessary physical protection measure into consideration (e.g. guards,
camera’s, fences, etc.).  This can have a definite influence on the cost factor and the
final risk classification.
As with the interaction between the probability and impact concepts (See point 4.3),
the degree of correction can also not function in isolation and must therefore be
integrated with the cost factor. The reason for this is that the degree of correction has
a definite influence on the cost of an organisation.
This chapter aims to elaborate more on the degree of correction’s role in the risk
analysis process and its combination with the cost of risk factor.
6.2 DEGREE OF CORRECTION CONCEPT IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE “TIQCAM” MODEL
Before one can establish the real cost of a risk, it is necessary to look at the degree of
correction, which means that safeguarding and/or control measures must first be taken
into consideration. Once this is done, the percentage of existing correction (see table
6.1) must then be subtracted before the degree of correction can be multiplied by the
cost of risk.
109
Table 6.1: Degree to which control measures are in place
Source: Own compilation
The estimated cost of a risk must be balanced against the degree of correction by
means of determining the physical control measures implemented. This is also
accomplished by looking at the criteria, risk indicator and the risk rating.
6.2.1 Degree of Correction criteria
The following criteria are applicable as follows:
· Positively eliminated 100%
· Reduced at least 75%
· Reduced by 50%
· Reduced by 25% to 50%
· Slight effect (less than 25%)
6.2.2 Degree of Correction Risk Indicator
The degree of correction risk indicator will be reflected according to the
correction criteria.
Classification Rating
100% control measures in place 1
At least 75% control measures in place 2
Control measures between 50-75% in place 3
Control measures between 25 to 50% in place 4
Less than 25% control measures in place 5
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Correction Criteria Correction Risk Indicator
· Positively eliminated 100% Very Low
· Reduced by 75%  Low
· Reduced by 50%   Medium
· Reduced by 25% to 50%  High
· Slight effect (Less than 25%) Very High
Correction Risk Rating
It is important that every risk indicator must have a risk rating in order to
come to a positive rating of the risk problem.
Correction Risk Indicator Correction Risk Rating
Very Low 1.00
Low 0.75
Medium 0.50
High 0.25
Very high 0.0
It is now necessary to combine the degree of correction concept aspects in
table form as illustrated in table 6.2.
Table 6.2: Combined illustration of the degree of correction aspects
Risk
Problem
Correction criteria Correction Risk
Indicator
Correction Risk
Rating
Robbery Reduced by 50% Medium  0.50
Fraud Reduced by 75% Low  0.75
Source:  Own compilation
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6.3 JOINED CONCEPTS WITH THE DEGREE OF CORRECTION IN
EXCEL FORMAT
The degree of correction concept as indicated in table 6.2. is joined with the other
concepts (see tables 3.4,  4.3 and 5.3) in an Excel format as suggested in chapter one
under point 1.6.3. The joining of these concepts will provide a better picture of the
model appearance so far (see figure 6.1).
Figure 6.1: Joined concepts in Excel format
Source:  Own compilation
6.4 CONCLUSION
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From the above it should be noted that the degree of correction plays a vital role in the
accurate outcome of the end result in the “TIQCAM” model.  Secondly, there is a
linear relationship between the degree of correction and the cost factor. The
implementing of protection measures not only makes a difference on the cost of an
organisation, but also ensures the mitigation of the risk.
The following chapter address the human factor concept, which is one of the concepts
introduced by the researcher in rounding off the “TIQCAM” model.
7 CHAPTER 7
HUMAN FACTOR AS A CONCEPT IN QUANTITATIVE RISK
ANALYSIS
7.1 INTRODUCTION
This discussion is the initiative of the researcher and is fundamental in combining all
quantitative risk analysis concepts together.
The human factor, also known as the “CHHP” approach, 25 is the first concept, which
will round the model off in an effective measuring way. The model which is
developed (see point 7.4) for the quantifying of physical risks will create not only a
more meaningful understanding, but will provide the decision maker with a more
effective tool in managing risks.
It is often said that risks occur due to the fact that people don’t know what they are
doing. According to Bedell (1998:22) it is a definite risk not to know how to handle
situations. Taking this statement into consideration it is thus the researcher’s view that
to analyse risks and to come to a reasonable conclusion, it is necessary to consider the
important human factors.
                                                
25  “CHHP” approach is the researchers own design  and takes human aspects such as, control measures,
handling of risks, human attitude regarding risks and the organization procedures, in consideration
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This chapter will not only focus on the human factors, but will conclude the
discussion on joining all the concepts as per chapters 3-6. The end result will also
present the outcome of the “TIQCAM” model by involving the total risk rating, risk
classifications and future actions (see figure’s 7.2 and 7.3). Guidelines for the
implementation of the “TIQCAM” model will conclude this discussion.
7.2 PERSPECTIVE ON HUMAN FACTORS
Human factor analysis and tests can be traced to the early efforts of engineers and
psychologists and focuses on the systematically identification and evaluation of
human errors26 (Sawyer & Lowery 1994:1).   According to Baybutt (1996:5), it is
generally believed that 50 – 90% of business incidents can be attributed to human
errors.  There are various ways, of classifying human errors according to Baybutt
(1996:7) The simplest is by (i) omission error – action not performed (ii)
commission error – action is performed incorrectly and (iii) extraneous act  - non-
required action is performed instead of or in addition to required act.
According to Davies (2004:3)  qualitative data plays a vital role in the human factor
analysis and are sources of information in their own right.  Data are important for two
reasons, firstly, details of human errors, intensions, expectations, beliefs, and motives
can only be accessed through natural personal accounts (discourse). Secondly, whilst
the meaning of what people say is usually seen as inherent in the words they use (i.e.
the meaning is semantic; thus leading to a simplistic distinction between accounts
which are “true”  and “lies”) an approach via functional attribution theory sees all
accounts as primarily functional (Davies 2004:3).
Researchers in the field of Human factor analysis, such as Davies (2004:3) Sawyer &
Lowery (1994:1) and Baybutt (1996: 5), solely focus on the reliability of human
factors and not in the complete combining of all relevant concepts (i.e. probability,
impact, cost of risk, etc.) in a quantifiable manner.
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 Taking the foresaid views in consideration, it is the perception of the researcher that
the human factor concept cannot be seen in isolation and should accommodate all
other concepts (see chapters 3 – 6) in the quantitative risk analysis process.
The following discussion regarding the “CHHP” approach is specially developed to
accommodate the human factor concept in quantifying risks in conjunction with
concepts such as probability, impact, cost of risk and degree of correction, to ensure a
reasonable accurate risk rating score.
7.3 HUMAN FACTOR LINK WITH THE “CHHP” APPROACH
As mentioned in footnote 25, the “CHHP” approach involves human factors such as
(i) control measures, (ii) human attitude, (iii) handling of risk, (iv) policies and
procedures.   The “CHHP” approaches is not only focussing  on humans per se, but
also taking the overall measures of determining the probability of crime into account.
According to McGoey (1990:6) quantitative analysis involves a decision making
process for processing crime statistics involving aspects such as premises, location
and history.  The question under control measures  (see 7.3.1) is design for the
purpose to include the history, location and the industry.
7.3.1 Control Measures27
In most instances when risks are identified, it happens that there is a lack of
control measures. This can be seen as a human task in assuring that control
measures are in place to minimize identified risks.
The question for establishing the rating is as follows:
Q = Are you satisfied with the security control measures and the equipment
used in preventing the risk?
                                                                                                                                                       
26 Human error is any action that exceeds some limit of acceptability or performance for a process or system in
which the human is a component (Baybutt 1996:7)
27 For the purpose of this study, control measures will also includes equipment used in preventing risks.
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The answer in establishing the risk score is as follows:
The score is rated on a scale from 1-4 with 1 being the lowest ratio, which
means that a satisfactory score is obtained. The highest score is 4, which
means that no control measures and equipment are in place or in use and is
therefore unsatisfactory.
7.3.2 Human aspect28
Human attitude towards the risk is of utmost importance, especially when
confronted with criminal risks. For example, when a bank robbery occurs,
what should the cashier’s attitude towards the potential robber be? If it is one
of negativity, it could place the lives of all bank personnel and visitors in great
danger.
The question for establishing the rating is as follows:
Q = Are you satisfied with the attitude of personnel regarding the risk?
The answer in establishing the risk score is as follows:
The score is rated on a scale of 1-4 with 1 being the lowest ratio which means
a satisfactory score is obtained. The highest score is 4, which indicates that the
attitude aspect can be of a very risky nature for individuals and is thus
unsatisfactory.
7.3.3 Handling of risks
The researcher experienced that the greatest problem in organizations and
even in the security industry, is that individuals don’t know how to handle
risks. This can be ascribed to a lack in knowledge and skills.
                                                
28 The term “human” refers to decision makers, which could include personnel and management depending on
the involvement in the risk situation.
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The question for establishing the rating is as follows:
Q = Are you satisfied that personnel have the necessary knowledge and skills
in handling risk?
The answer in establishing the risk score is as follows:
The score is rated on a scale of 1-4 with 1 being the lowest ratio which means
a satisfactory score is obtained. The highest is 4, which indicates that no
knowledge or skills can have a tremendous impact on the organization in the
event of managing risks and is rated as unsatisfactory.
7.3.4 Policies and procedures
It is of utmost importance that policies and procedures are put in place in
managing risks within an organization.  This is a management function and
should be delegated or channelled down to personnel at floor level.  According
to Baybutt (1996:7) personnel should acquaint themselves with company
written an unwritten policies and procedures, rules as well as computer
software.  Human errors in this regard can lead to increased risk situations.
The question for establishing the rating is as follows:
Q = Are you satisfied that company policies and procedures are in place
regarding company risks and are you acquainted therewith?
The answer in establishing the risk score is as follows:
The score is rated on a scale of 1-4 with 1 being the lowest ratio which means
a satisfactory score is obtained. The highest score is 4, which indicates that no
policies and procedures are available in managing risks with a company is
rated as unsatisfactory.
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7.3.5 Combining human factors into a risk matrix
In discussing the abovementioned “CHHP” approach it is therefore necessary
to combine the factors in order to establish a total point, which will then be
quantified to a total point and integrated with all the other previously
discussed concepts. A sample of such combination is shown in table 7.1.
Table 7.1: “CHHP” Approach Risk Matrix
Source:  Own compilation
7.4 HUMAN FACTOR CONCEPT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
“TIQCAM” MODEL
Factor Question Score
  1          2       3         4
Control Measures Are you satisfied with the control measures and equipment used
in preventing risks?
x
Human Aspects Are you satisfied with the attitude of the personnel regarding the
risk?
x
Handling of risks Are you satisfied that personnel have the necessary knowledge
and skills in handling risks?
x
Policies and procedures Are you satisfied that policies and procedures are in place
regarding company risks?
x
Total Score 11
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With reference to point 7.2, the human factor also known as the “CHHP” approach,
and contains questions in which a score is granted as indicated in the discussion
below:
7.4.1 Control measures
Are you satisfied with the security control measures and the equipment used in
preventing the risk?
Satisfied  = 1
Unsatisfied = 4
7.4.2 Handling of risks
Are you satisfied with personnel having the necessary knowledge and skills in
handling risks?
Satisfied  = 1
Unsatisfied = 4
7.4.3 Humanity
Are you satisfied with the attitude of personnel regarding the risk?
      Satisfied  = 1
Unsatisfied = 4
7.4.4 Policies and procedures
Are you satisfied that company policies and procedures are in place regarding
company risks and are you acquainted therewith?
Satisfied   = 1
Unsatisfied  = 4
Before the criteria, risk indicator and risk rating are discussed; it is necessary
to consider all the aforesaid factors to establish the total score.
Scores are allocated to the different human factors and rated on a scale of 1-4,
which means that 1 is the lowest score and can thus be accepted as
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satisfactory. Therefore the highest score is 4, which indicates that immediate
attention is needed to rectify the situation.
All the human factor’s maximum scores (4) are taken into consideration to
establish the total score (see table 7.1).  The total score of 16 (4 questions x 4
maximum score) would indicate an unsatisfactory score whereas 1 is
considered as the minimum score and an indication of a satisfactory indicator.
Human factor criteria
The following criteria are established by reverting the “CHHP” ratings into
criteria scores as indicated below:
· Unsatisfactory score between 10-16
· Satisfactory to a unsatisfactory score between 4 - 9
· Satisfactory score between 1-3
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Human factor risk indicator
The human factor risk indicator will be reflected according to the aforesaid
criteria.
Criteria   Risk Indicator
·  Score between 10 - 16 High priority attention             
needed
·  Score between 4 - 9  Medium attention needed
· Score between 1-3 Adequate
· Score less than 3          No attention needed
Human factor risk rating
It is important that every risk indicator must have a risk rating in order to
come to a positive rating of the risk problem. To establish the correct score,
the total of 16 was divided into suitable scores for each indicator.
Human factor risk indicator Human factor risk rating
High priority attention needed 9
Medium priority attention needed 5
No attention needed      2
It is now necessary to combine the human factor concept aspects in table form
as illustrated in table 7.2.
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Table 7.2: Combined illustration of the human factors
Risk Problem Human factor
criteria
Human factor
risk indicator
Human factor
risk rating
Robbery Between 1-3 No attention
needed
 2
Fraud Between 10-16 High priority
attention needed
 9
Source:  Own Compilation
7.5 JOINED CONCEPTS IN EXCEL FORMAT
It is important that the concepts as per figures 4.1, 5.1 and 6.1 now be illustrated in
Excel spreadsheet format as suggested in Chapter 1 under point 1.6.3. These aforesaid
concepts are joined together in order to give the reader a better picture of the model
appearance as per figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1: Joined concepts in Excel format
Source: Own compilation
122
7.5.1 Fundamentals of the “TIQCAM” theory
Referring to figure 7.1, the next phases play a fundamental role in the end
result of the model, namely:
· Total Risk Rating;
· Risk Classification;
· Future Actions.
Bearing in mind that after discussing the aforesaid aspects, it will also form
part of the quantitative risk analysis concepts displayed in the Excel format as
per table 7.2.
7.5.1.1 Formula for calculating risk classification
The following scientific statement describes the range in which the
“Risk Total” can be classified (see table 7.3).
Table 7.3: Scientific formula describing how the risk total can
be classified
            Source: Own Compilation
Taking the abovementioned formula into consideration, it reflects
equalization of the minimum and maximum risks.
· The lowest score will equal “0” when calculated against the
minimum risk criteria.
· The highest score will equal “198” when calculated against the
maximum risk criteria.
=IF(V4>=132,”VERY HIGH RISK”,IF(V4>=99,”HIGH
RISK”,IF(V4>=66,”SUBSTANTIAL RISK”,IF(V4>=33,
“LOW RISK”,IF(V4>=0,”MINIMAL RISK”,”NO
DATA”)))))
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Taking the aforesaid scientific statement in mind, the universal
formula for calculating the “risk total” is seen in table 7.4.
Table 7.4: Equation – Risk Formula
Source:  Own compilation
When substituting the abovementioned formula with the maximum
and minimum risk ratings, the overall range within the respective risk
ratings will then be “0” and “198” as classified in the aforesaid
discussion. The following calculation is applicable in obtaining the
different risk classification, for example:
Risk Subtotal = 1.0 x (5+5) x 5 x 4 = 200
Degree of Correction = 0.01 x 200 = 2
Risk Total = 800 – 8 = 198
The risk formula as indicated in table 7.4 consists of six risk
concepts. For this reason the maximum risk total of 198 has been
divided by the six concepts (198/6 = 33) to at least establish a risk
rating range for the five different risk classifications as per table 7.5.
Table 7.5: Different Risk Classifications
Risk Subtotal = Probability x (Severity + Sensitivity) x Cost  x Human
Factors
Degree of Correction = Risk Subtotal – (degree of correction x risk
subtotal)
Risk Total = Risk Subtotal – Degree of Correction
      Minimum                 0 – 32
      Low                         33 – 65
      Medium                   66 – 98
      High                         99 – 131
      Very High                132 - 198
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Source: Own compilation
7.5.1.2 Total application of concept and risk rating in establishing the
risk classification
This is the final stage in establishing the total outcome of the two
examples namely, “robbery” and “fraud” risk classifications. It will
thus indicate whether the two risks is a minimum or very high risk in
the magazine distributing company.
· Calculation formula for the “robbery” risk
Probability 0.5 x (Sensitivity 4 + Severity 2) x Cost Factor 3 x
Human Factor 2 = Risk Subtotal 18
Degree of Correction 0.50 x Risk Subtotal 18 = 9
Risk Subtotal 18 – Degree of Correction 9 = Risk Total 9
Risk total of 9 indicates a minimum risk as indicated in table 7.5
· Calculation formula for the “Fraud” risk
Probability 1 x (Sensitivity 2 + Severity 3) x Cost Factor 2 x
Human Factor 4 = Risk Subtotal 40
Degree of Correction 0.75 x Risk Subtotal 40 = 30
Risk subtotal 40 – Degree of Correction 30 = Risk total 10
Risk total of 10 indicates a minimum risk as indicated in table 7.5
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Taking the aforementioned two examples into consideration, it
now reaches the stage where the calculation formula is joined
with the already established concepts as mentioned in table 7.2.
The risk subtotal, risk total and the risk classification are
displayed in figure 7.2 and 7.3 below:
Figure 7.2: Joined calculation of the robbery example
Source: Own compilation
Figure 7.3: Joined calculation of the fraud example
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Source: Own compilation
From the above figures it is clear that the “TIQCAM” model
quantifies the risks in a manner that any management can secure the
effective-ness in managing their own risks.
7.6 GUIDELINES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
“TIQCAM” MODEL
The “TIQCAM” model can be implemented by using it not only in the private
security industry, but also in all business sectors where physical risk is applicable.
The “TIQCAM” model can also form part of any business policy where there can be
worked from and it is thus suggested that the implementation takes place in phases as
discussed in sub-section 7.5.1.
7.6.1 Phases for implementing the “TIQCAM” model
The researcher is of the opinion that the private security industry should have
a policy whereby security managers must be knowledgeable in the use of the
“TIQCAM” model to analyze physical risk. From this point of view the
following phases are suggested.
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Phase 1: Approval by principle
The implementation of the “TIQCAM” model for training purposes should be
approved by principle so that security managers can be aware of the existence
of the quantitative risk analysis model. This should minimize the stigma of
inferiority that security managers are only knowledgeable in the security
aspects and not in the specialized field of risk analysis. Naseb security is the
first to grant approval that all their security managers be trained in the
analyzing of physical risk, which can form part of their tendering policy for
new business and is thus also in line with corporate governance which places
the emphasis strongly on the risk analysis aspect (See Chapter 2 point 2.6).
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Phase 2: Issuer of Policy
The policy-making component must give the necessary assistance to the
quantitative risk analysis model (“TIQCAM”) and it should be in writing as
soon as possible.  This will enable the quick implementation of the model.
During a Naseb security29 director’s meeting held on 3 February 2004, it was
suggested that Naseb should draft a policy which will enable them to make use
of the “TIQCAM” model, not only for their own purposes, but also for use in
identify their clients’ risk. A concept draft will be discussed at a next board
meeting, which will take place in August 2004.
Phase 3: Marketing of the “TIQCAM” model
When the policy framework is in position, then the “TIQCAM” model can be
introduced as a cost-effective approach in corporate training, not only for
security managers but also managers in their different fields of interest.
Phase 4: Training of security managers
The researcher is of the opinion that training is one of the most effective ways
in implementing models. Security managers need guidance in the use of the
“TIQCAM” model as part of management training.  The initial formal training
is a direct outcome of this research.  The researcher trained his security
managers in the use of the aforesaid model and in general no problems were
experienced.  Symposiums and risk management conferences are still the best
form of promoting the “TIQCAM” model as a practical training method for
security managers.
                                                
29 Naseb security originate in 1999 due to an out sourcing process at Naspers, whereby the researcher and two
partners started the company called “Soloprop 1049 t/a Naseb (See out sourcing and approval letter from
Naspers - Appendix E & F).
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7.6.2 Implementation and management of the “TIQCAM” model
The implementation of the “TIQCAM” model starts during the identification
process, which is the beginning of the training approach that should take place.
Security managers that are involved in the analyzing of risk should be
thoroughly trained and informed how to undertake the task, especially in the
use of the aforesaid model.  The training of managers will probably take place
during normal working hours, because of the fact that the whole process of
risk analysis forms part of the work situation.  Due to the fact that security
managers are in need of guidance in the use of the “TIQCAM” model,
arrangements should be made for a learning programme, as discussed in the
following sub-section 7.5.3.
7.6.3 Guidance for the training of security managers in the “TIQCAM” model
The researcher foresees that the training of security managers in the use of the
“TIQCAM” model will rather take place on a modular basis than a self study
package as this training is more of an on-the-job training orientation.
Each of the “TIQCAM” model concepts will form a training module. This will
enable the student and/or security manager not only to understand the process
of quantitative risk analysis, but also the important role that the concepts play
in the end result of the correct classifying of risks within an organization. With
the researcher’s training of Naseb security managers, the same basis was
followed and it and was successfully implemented. The training approach
followed by the researcher involved the following steps:
· Orientation of the “TIQCAM” model as discussed in Chapter 2;
· Fundamental concept approach as discussed in Chapters 3, to 6
· The need for the private security manager to be trained in the quantitative
risk analysis model as discussed in Chapter 7.
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With the aforesaid approach in mind, it may happen that in future this
“TIQCAM” package can be registered as a training package, which can be
used by all security training institutions in South Africa or internationally.
7.7 CONCLUSION
It is the researcher’s contention that the security industry is in urgent need of a
quantitative analysis measuring tool, such as the “TIQCAM” model, in securing better
skilled and knowledgeable managers able to identify and manage risks.
It is also said that security managers have to remember that they cannot be lax in
security by just patching what they think is wrong. A better understanding of the risk
analysis process will enable them to conduct a risk reduction analysis and to advise
their clients on various options to secure their assets.
With the development of the “TIQCAM” model as an Excel measuring tool, it will
not only secure value-added services, but will also form the basis from where the
security manager can follow a structural process in the total risk concept use. The
enclosure of the different risk concept approaches implies that a more effective,
realistic and useful assumption can be obtained of how high or low risks are in
companies.
It was also stated that with the implementation of the ‘TIQCAM” model as a
measuring tool, it could also secure a policy-making role within organizational
context.
The implementation of the aforesaid model is also described by means of the model
and presented in phases for implementation. Seeing that these phases play a
fundamental role in the implementation, the emphasis is strongly placed on the
“training” phase, which is the phase that is the most effective medium to secure
implementation of any model. From the aforementioned discussion, the following
chapter will round off the whole research project by looking at the findings and
recommendations regarding the “TIQCAM” model.
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8 CHAPTER 8
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
8.1 INTRODUCTION
With the non-existence of a suitable physical quantitative risk analysis model for the
private security industry , this research project was focused on the development of an
effective and/or useful measuring tool for the South African security manager. The
first model called “FAMASER” is taken as the basis where upon an easy-to-use
model, as requested by security managers, (see point 1.6.3) is developed. This model
called the Total integrated quantitative concept analysis model (“TIQCAM”), were
received with great enthusiasm by security delegates during the pre-testing of the
model (see point 1.5.3.4), which in their views, is a breakthrough for the private
security industry in South Africa.
This research also sets the necessary guidelines, which are fundamental in the
measuring of risks to ensure a realistic outcome of the risk classification by applying
workable concepts. The applications of these concepts are far-reaching, and any
dynamic system that meets the assumptions can be analysed by the “TIQCAM“
approach.
This chapter intends to establish whether the goals are achieved regarding the overall
research done in this thesis, and to come up with findings relating to the following:
· Objectives;
· Hypotheses;
· Methodology;
· Empirical data.
Recommendations and possible future research regarding the possibility of extending
or developing an advanced quantitative risk analysis model will end this study.
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8.2 FINDINGS
8.2.1 Findings relating to the objectives
With reference to Chapter 1 under point 1.3, regarding the research objectives,
the need for a quantitative risk analysis model in the private security industry
has been determined by means of personal interviews and using an
information schedule (see point 1.5.3.3). It was determined that security
managers do not receive formal training in quantitative risk analysis and that
no suitable models exist that can be used as a software tool in analysing their
clients’ risks as a value-added service.
A theoretical investigation also indicates that although a quantitative analysis
model on decision-making exists (see point 1.2 - referring to C.J.Roelofse),
the “TIQCAM”30 model especially intends to provide an Excel software tool
for the private security industry in South Africa. A pre-test (see point 1.5.3.4)
was done where security managers expressed the need for a so-called “Easy-
To-Use” model.
 During a presentation of the ‘TIQCAM’ model to a group of security
managers, the members reacted positively to the model and they see it as a
great breakthrough for the security industry. The conclusion is therefore that
there is a definite need for a quantitative risk analysis model that can be used
in a scientifically justifiable way by the security industry.
8.2.2 Findings relating to the hypothesis
By taking the abovementioned finding on the objectives into consideration, it
is clear that this supports empirically the hypothesis set in Chapter 1,
paragraph 1.4.
                                                
30 The “TIQCAM” model originate from the first developed model called “FAMASER” (See discussion under
point 1.5.3.4).
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With reference to the information schedule (see appendix A) it is clear that
both the hypothesis (see point 1.4) supports the view that no quantitative risk
analysis model exists or that security managers in the researcher’s survey (see
Table 1.2) are knowledgeable in all the aspects of quantitative risk analysis.
Based on these facts it can be assumed that no practical quantitative risk
analysis model exists for the South African private security industry and that
security managers are unskilled in this regard, gave rise to a theoretical model
to quantitatively measure risks by integrating all the necessary risk analysis
concepts, this includes the newly established concept by the researcher (see
Chapter 7 – Human factor link with the “CHHP” approach). This proves the
integrated nature of the “TIQCAM “ model and that the practical use can be a
value-added tool in the hands of the security manager.
8.2.3 Findings relating to the methodology
Each researcher has his own way of approaching his subject and the
formulation thereof. For the researcher, the methodology that was followed
was not only satisfactory, but also gave rise to certain deductions with regard
to the development of a quantitative risk analysis model for the security
industry.
The methodology in this study strengthens this deduction in the following
ways:
· In the security industry, the development of a quantitative risk analysis
model is a strategy that can be followed for human resource development.
In the light of the strong emphasis placed on risk analysis in South Africa
(King, section 2.6, p.68), risk analysis should form one of the cornerstones
of successful training of security managers.
· The application or use of a risk analysis model can only be communicated
by means of an expert instructor. Printed material will still form the basis
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of the learning material, as it remains the most viable medium to represent
quantitative aspects regarding the presentation of a model.
· A quantitative risk analysis cannot be implemented effectively without the
support of the policy makers. Consequently, there has to be a training
policy that addresses the specific application of a physical risk analysis
model by security managers. It not only creates a favourable marketing
opportunity, but also the possibility for the private security industry to
ensure an added value to service for their clients.
· Quantitative risk analysis is no longer isolated from the total spectrum of
physical security services, but rather forms an integral part of the total
security strategy.
8.2.4 Findings relating to the empirical data
Coetzee exclaims in Roelofse (2001:22) “Laat empirie nou spreek tot teorie”
(Let the empirical now speak to theory).  It is the researcher’s perception that
empirical data can only strengthen the theory especially where model
development is applicable.
In this study a new theoretical model has been proposed and empirically tested
in Chapters 3 to 7. The formulas for calculating the risk classification (see
tables 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5) involved the different risk analysis concepts, has their
own risk criteria, risk indicator and risk rating.
Although all the concept formulas are multiplied with each other, the only
subtract able concept is the “ the degree of correction” (see Chapter 6), which
focuses on subtracting the security measures that are in place.  Calculations
are presented in percentage, which not only makes the “TIQCAM” model
more reliable, but also enables the model to be more accurate in the outcome
of the risk classification.
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When joining all these concepts together, it forms a suitable empirical
software tool, which can be useful in any decision-making process.  
8.3 RECOMMENDATIONS
Before any recommendations can be made it is necessary to first look at the
following two very important aspects:
· Possible value of this research;
· Possible shortcomings of this research.
Possible value of this research
This research with regard to a risk analysis model for the security industry in
South Africa has established that a need exists to develop a quantitative risk
analysis model that serves as a handy tool in the application of physical risks.
What makes this model unique is the fact that an integrated approach was
followed in the application of different risk concepts to ensure an accurate and
effective result during the risk analysis process. This concept approach is also a
first for the security industry where the human factor, as one of the most important
concepts, has not been excluded from the total risk analysis process. A training
curriculum that can be used in human resource development is also currently
under consideration. In this way, the security industry’s aim to ensure a total and
effective security service to clients at all times can be strengthened. This model
also creates the possibility for the development of a more advanced quantitative
risk analysis model.
As this research focuses on the security manager as an entity, it is possible that the
model can also be utilised by security commanders and/or shift leaders. Therefore,
this research also has possibilities for application outside the security milieu.
Possible shortcomings of this research
A big restrictive factor is the availability of funds to create the necessary
infrastructure to establish a risk analysis training system that uses quantitative risk
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analysis methods to strengthen security management in South Africa’s knowledge
and skills level. The real cost-effectiveness of human resource development in
quantitative risk analysis has also not been determined in the course of this
research.
8.3.1 Recommendations for the industry
An awareness campaign must be undertaken by means of interviews and
briefings to all senior top management members regarding the value and
practical implementation of the “TIQCAM” model for the security industry.
The research suggests that this takes place in phases as expounded in Chapter
7, section 7.5.1, that includes some of the following:
· Obtaining approval in principle for the training of security managers
regarding the “TIQCAM” model within the security industry.
· Promulgating policy by the policy makers within the security industry so
that learning opportunities are created for the security manager.
· Training of security managers to not only increase the level of knowledge
regarding risk analysis, but also to be of greater value to their clients. This
addresses the added value to service concept.
· Marketing of the model will also make the top security management aware
of what the model entails and what possibilities it has.
8.3.2 Recommendations for further research
Quantitative risk analysis as a human resource development strategy in the
security industry should be investigated continuously. The development of
more advanced risk analysis models can also lead to a more specialised task
for individuals within the occupational milieu.
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8.4 END
A quantitative risk analysis model for the security industry is an unfamiliar
phenomenon, firstly due to their lack of involvement in risk analysis and
ignorance of the subject, and secondly due to their continued focus on the physical
aspect of security (e.g. entrance control, escorting, etc.). With the still growing
security industry at national and international level, it is essential that security
managers develop their knowledge and skills in the use of the correct aids to analyse
the risks within their own industry and in that of their clients. The value of the
quantitative risk analysis model (“TIQCAM”) can be considered as a training
strategy to strengthen the levels of knowledge and skills of all security managers.
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APPENDIX A: INFORMATION SCHEDULE FOR SECURITY
MANAGERS
Question 1 Specific
Answer
with X
How is "risk analysis” defined in Quantification of uncertainty
your organization. Quantitative estimation and analysis of potential problems
Quantified cost initiatives
Quantitative list of schedule and technical risks
Probable cost estimate
Sensitivity analyses
Judgemental estimate of low-high range
*Not really defined
Question 2 Specific
Answer
with X
Is "risk analysis" a separate task, Integrated
or is it an integral part of the cost Mixed
Partially or always separate task
*Not really defined
Question 3 Specific
Answer
with X
What computer tools are used to In-House (Customized)
support risk analysis Tools supplied by consultants
*None
Question 4 Specific
Answer
with X
Is risk analysis considered to be Yes
a highly specialized skill. *No
Question 5 Specific
Answer
with X
To what degree is analysis, as
defined here, accepted by Unqualified acceptance
management. Acceptance varies with the manager
Yes, as long as very difficult issues not encompassed
Slight to moderate acceptance
*Accepted as information only. Managers in denial
*Listen attentively then do as please
*Not well accepted. " Can do" optimism prevails
* Negative rating
Question 6 Specific
Answer
with X
Is there a functional department Auditors
A-2
responsible for performing risk Management
analysis. *Not applicable
*Not assigned specifically
Question 7 Specific
Answer
with X
Does your company provide internal Yes, formal training
training or class in risk analysis. Yes, external
Only informally
*None
Question 8 Specific
Answer
with X
As preformed by your organization, Statistical analysis of history
is risk analysis mostly judgemental Low - High range picked without analysis
or based on statistical projections Guided Survey
from historical data. *Not really defined
Question 9 Specific
Answer
with X
How do you display the outcome Quantitative risk display
of risk assessment to management Qualitative risk display
or your clients. *None
Question 10 Specific
Answer
with X
Analysts tend to prefer certain types Normal
of probability distributions. What *None / irrelevant
distribution type does your
organization find best
Question 11 Specific
Answer
with X
When your organization finds Improve at higher cost
unacceptably high risk, how do you Second opinion from a professional
reduce the risk. *Stop work and wait for affordable technology
Look at various other risk management approaches
Adjust the process
*No idea
Question 12 Specific
Answer
with X
Do your company offer and or carry Yes. Not using a risk analysis tool
out risk analysis as part of your Yes, by contracting a risk analyst
service to your clients. *No, form not part of our service to the client
B-1
APPENDIX B: QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS E-MAIL MESSAGE NO
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APPENDIX D: SECURITY SURVEY CHECKLIST
Security Survey Work Sheets
This is a basic guide that may be used to assist personnel in performing
physical surveys in most industrial settings.
General Questions before Starting Survey
• Date of survey.
• Interview with [name of decision maker].
• Number of copies of survey desired by client, to be forwarded to:
• Obtain plot plan. Plot the production flow on plot plan and establish direction of north
• Position and title of persons interviewed.
• Correct name and address of plant.
• Type of business or manufacture.
• Square footage of production or manufacturing space.
• Property other than main facility to be surveyed is located at:
• Property known as:
• Property consists of:
• What activity is in progress here?
• Is there other local property that will not be surveyed? Why?
• If plot plan is not complete, sketch remainder of property to be surveyed.
Number of Employees
• Administrative—total number all shifts
• Skilled and unskilled—total number on each shift:
1st shift
2d shift
3d shift
Maintenance/clean-up crew
Normal shift schedule and break times
• Salaried
1st shift
2d shift
3d shift
Maintenance/clean-up crew
• What days of the week is manufacturing in process?
• Are employees authorized to leave plant during breaks?
• Are hourly employees union or not?
• Are company guards in union bargaining unit?
Cafeteria
• Where is cafeteria located?
• What are hours of operation?
• Is it company or concession operated?
• What is security of proceeds from sales?
• What is security of foodstuffs?
• What is method of supply of foodstuffs?
• How are garbage and trash removed?
• Where is location of vending machines?
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• Where is change maker/ if any?
Credit Union
• Where is credit union located?
• How is money secured?
• How are records secured?
• How is office secured?
• What are hours of operation?
• How much money is kept during day and overnight?
Custodial Service
• Is it outside contract or company employees?
• What hours do they actually start and complete work?
• Do they have keys in their possession?
• How is trash removed by them?
• Who, if anyone/ controls removal?
• Who controls their entrance and exit?
• Are they supervised toy any company employee?
Company Store
• Where is company store located?
• What are hours of operation?
• What method is used to control stock?
• How is stock supplied from plant?
• Number of clerks working in store?
• How is cash handled?
• When are and who performs inventories?
• How are proceeds from sales secured?
• How is the store secured?
Petty Cash or Funds on Hand
• In what office are funds kept?
• What is the normal amount?
• How are these funds secured?
• Who has general knowledge of amount normally on hand?
Classified Operations
• Is government classified work performed?
• What is the degree of classification?
• How are classified documents secured?
• What is security during manufacture?
• What is classification of finished product?
• Are government cognizant officers on premises?
• Is company classified R&D performed?
• Is company classified work sensitive to industry?
• What degree of security is it given?
• What degree of security does it require?
• What are the locations of the various processing areas and
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containers?
Theft Experience
• Office machines or records.
• Locker room incidents.
• Pilferage of employees' autos.
• Pilferage of vending machines.
• Pilferage from money changer.
• Thefts of company-owned safety equipment.
• Theft of tools.
• Theft of raw material and finished product.
• Are thefts systematic or casual?
• Have any definite patterns been established?
• Are background investigations conducted prior to employment of
any personnel?
• What category of personnel is investigated?
• What is the extent of investigations?
The foregoing questions/ answered properly/ will assist you in devel-
oping the degree of control required for various areas/ information that can
be secured only through an interview—the more probing the better. You
should now also have a working knowledge of the general operational plan.
Before starting your detailed examination and study/ you must take a guided
orientation tour of the facility to acquaint yourself with the physical setting.
Make notes on your plot plan and pad during this tour.
I. Physical Description of the Facility
• Is the facility subject to natural-disaster phenomena?
• Describe in detail the above if applicable.
• What mayor vehicular and railroad arteries serve this facility?
• How many wood-frame buildings? Describe and identify them.
• How many load-bearing brick buildings? Describe and identify them.
• How many light or heavy steel-frame buildings? Describe and identify them
• How many reinforced concrete buildings? Describe and identify them.
• Are all buildings within one perimeter? If not/ describe.
II. Perimeter Security
• Describe type of fence/ walls/ buildings/ and physical perimeter barriers.
• Is fencing of acceptable height, design, and construction?
• What is present condition of all fencing?
• Is material stored near fencing?
• Are poles or trees near fencing? If so, is height of fence increased?
• Are there any small buildings near fencing? If so, is the height of fence increased?
• Does undergrowth exist along the fencing?
• Is there an adequate clear, zone on both sides along fencing?
• Can vehicles drive up to fencing?
• Are windows of buildings on the perimeter properly secured??
• Is wire mesh on windows adequate for its purpose?
• Are there any sidewalk elevators at this facility? If so, are they properly secured when not in
operation?
• How are sidewalk elevators secured during operation?
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• Do storm sewers or utility tunnels breach the barrier?
• Are these sewers or tunnels adequately secured?
• Is the perimeter barrier regularly maintained and inspected?
• How many gates and doors are there on the perimeter?
• Number used by personnel (visitors, employees)?
• Number used by vehicles?
• Number used by railroad?
• How is each gate controlled?
• Are all gates adequately secured and operating properly?
• Are railroad gates supervised by the guard force during operations?
• How are the railroad gates controlled?
• Do swinging gates close without leaving a gap?
• Are gates not used. secured and sealed properly?
• What is security control of opened gates?
• Are chains and locks of adequate construction used to secure gates?
• Are any alarm devices used at the gates?
• Is CCTV used to observe gates or any part of the perimeter?
• How many doors from buildings open onto the perimeter?
• What type are they—personnel or vehicular?
• How are they secured when not in use?
• What is security control when in use?
• How many emergency doors breach the perimeter barrier?
• How are the emergency doors secured to prevent unauthorized use?
• Are there any unprotected areas on the perimeter?
• What portion of the fence does the guards observe while making rounds?
III. Building Security
A. Offices
• Where are the various administrative offices located generally?
• When are offices locked?
• Who is responsible to check security at end of day?
• How and where are company records stored?
• How are they secured?
• Are vaults equipped with temperature thermostats? (rate-of- rise/Pyro-Larm)
• Are offices equipped with sprinklers? Fire extinguishers?
• Are any central station or local alarms installed to protect safes, cabinets, etc?
• Are various file cabinets locked?
• Are individual offices locked?
• Does the company have IBM computer rooms?
• What type of fire protection are they given?
B. Plant
• When and how are exterior doors locked?
• When and how are dock doors locked?
• Are individual plant offices locked?
• Are warehouses apart from production area secured?
• Are certain critical and vulnerable areas protected by alarms? What type?
• Are locker room windows covered by screening?
C. Tool Room
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• Is one or more established?
• Departmental or central tool room?
• What is the method of control and receipt?
• How is tool room secured?
D. Locker Rooms
• What is basis of issue to individual?
• What is type of locker—wall or elevated-basket type?
• How are individual lockers secured?
• Does company furnish keys/locks?
• Who or what department controls keys/locks?
• What control methods are used?
• How and when are keys and locks issued and returned?
• Are unannounced locker inspections made?
• Who conducts inspections and how often?
E. Special Areas That May Require Additional Attention (If the facility
houses the following types of activities, they may require special
individual inspection. Base recommendations on any or all of the
applicable portions of the checklist. You will, after the initial inspec-
tion tour, design a checklist applicable to these special areas.)
• Research and development areas
• Laboratories
• Storage areas for valuable, critical, or sensitive items
• Finished product test areas
• Finished-product display areas
• Vehicle parking garages apart from the facility
• Vacant or used lofts, attics, etc.
• Mezzanines or subbasements
• Aircraft hangars, maintenance shops, and crew quarters.
IV. Security of Shipping and Receiving Areas
• How many shipping docks, vehicle and railroad?
• What are the hours of operation of docks?
• What is the method of inventory control at docks?
• What is the method of control of classified items?
• What is the security of classified or "hot" items?
• What supervision is exercised at the docks?
• Are loaded and unloaded trucks sealed?
• Who is responsible for sealing vehicles?
• What type of seals is being used?
• How are truck drivers controlled?
• Is there a designed waiting room for truck drivers?
• Is it separated from company employees?
• Are areas open to other than dock employees?
• Do guards presently supervise these areas? Is this necessary?
• What is the method of accounting for material received?
• Is shipping done by parcel post?
• What is the control at point of packaging?
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• Who controls stamps or stamp machines?
• Who transports packages to post office?
• What is the method of transport to post office?
• Where is pick-up point at plant?
• What controls are exercised over the transport vehicle?
• Are inspections of operations made presently?
• Who conducts these inspections and how often?
• Does the facility have ship-loading wharves or docks?
• Are contract longshoremen used?
• How do longshoremen get to and from the docks?
• If they pass through the facility, how are they controlled?
• How are ships' company personnel controlled when given liberty?
• Are any specific routes through the facility designated for long- shoremen and ship personnel?
• If so, how is it marked and is it used?
• Are these personnel escorted?
• If they are not escorted what measures are taken to escort them?
• Is there any way in which these personnel could be kept from passing through the facility?
V. Area Security
• Can guards observe outside areas from their patrol routes?
• Do guards expose themselves to attack?
• Are patrols staggered so no pattern is established?
• What products are stored in outside areas?
• Is parking allowed inside the perimeter?
• If so, are controls established and enforced?
• Where do employees, visitors, and officials park?
• What security and control is provided?
• Are parking lots adequately secured?
• Is there a trash dump on the premises?
• How is it secured from the public?
• Is it manned by company employees?
• Is its approach directly from the manufacturing facility?
• Do roads within the perimeter present a traffic problem?
• Do rivers, canals, public thoroughfares, or railroads pass through the plant?
• Are loaded trucks left parked within the perimeter?
• If so, what protection is given them?
• Do the roads outside the facility present a traffic problem?
• What are these problems and how can they be remedied?
• Is there any recreational activity within the perimeter, such as baseball?
• Are these areas fenced off from the remainder of the property?
• Could they logically be fenced off?
VI. Protective Lighting
• Is protective lighting adequate on perimeter?
• What type of lighting is it?
• Is lighting of open areas within perimeter adequate?
• Do shadowed areas exist?
• Are outside storage areas adequately lighted?
• Are inside areas adequately lighted?
• Is the guard protected or exposed by the lighting?
• Are gates adequately lighted?
• Do lights at gate illuminate interior of vehicles?
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• Are critical and vulnerable areas well illuminated?
• Is protective lighting operated manually or automatically?
• Do cones of light on perimeter overlap?
• Are perimeter lights wired in series?
• Is the lighting at shipping and receiving docks or piers adequate?
• Is lighting in the parking lots adequate?
• Is there an auxiliary power source available?
• Is the interior of buildings adequately lighted?
• Are top secret and secret activities adequately lighted?
• Are guards equipped with powerful flashlights?
• How many more and what type of lights are needed to provide
adequate illumination? In what locations?
• Do security personnel report light outages?
• How soon are burned-out lights replaced?
VII. Key Control/Locking Devices, and Containers
• Is there a grandmaster, master, and submaster system? Describe it.
• Are locks used throughout the facility of the same manufacture?
• Is there a record of issuance of locks?
• Is there a record of issuance and inspection of keys?
• How many grandmaster and master keys are there in existence?
• What is the security of grandmaster and master keys?
• What is the security of the key cabinet or box?
• Who is charged with handling key control? Is the system ade-
quate? Describe the control system.
• What is the frequency of record and key inspections?
• Are keys made at the plant?
• Do key gows have a special design?
• What is the type of lock used in facility? Are all adequate in construction?
• Would keys be difficult to duplicate?
• Are locks changed periodically at critical locations?
• Are any "sesame" padlocks used for classified material storage
areas or containers?
• If a key cutting machine is used, is it properly secured?
• Are key blanks adequately secured?
• Are investigations made when master keys are lost?
• Are locks immediately replaced when keys are lost?
• Do locks have interchangeable; cores?
• Are extra cores properly safeguarded?
• Are combination locks three-position type
• Are safes located where the guard can observe them on rounds?
• How many people possess combinations to safes and containers?
• How often are combinations changed?
• What type of security containers are used for the protection of:
Money? Securities? High value metals? Company proprietary
material? Government classified information?
• Are lazy-man combinations used?
• Are birth dates, marriage dates, etc., used as combinations?
• Are combinations recorded anywhere in the facility where they
might be accessible to an intruder?
• Are the combinations recorded and properly secured so that
authorized persons can get them in emergencies?
• Is the same or greater security afforded recorded combinations as
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that provided by the lock?
• Where government classified information is concerned, does each
person in possession of a combination have the proper clearance
and the "need to know"?
• Have all faces of the container locked with a combination lock
been examined to see if combination is recorded?
• Are padlocks used on containers containing classified material chained to containers?
VIII. Control of Personnel and Vehicles
• Are passes or badges used? By whom?
• Type used? Describe in detail?
• Is colour coding used?
• Are badges uniformly worn on outer clothing?
• Are special passes issued? To whom? When?
• Who is responsible for issue and receipt of passes and badges?
• Are badges and passes in stock adequately secured?
• How are outside contractors controlled?
• How are visitors controlled?
• How are vendors controlled?
• How many employee entrances are there?
• What type of physical control is there at each entrance and exit?
• Where are the time clocks located?
• Is it possible to consolidate clock locations to one or two main clock alleys?
• Is there any control at time clock locations?
• Are there special entrances for people other than employees?
• How are the special entrances controlled?
• Are fire stairwells used for operational purposes?
• Does the facility use elevators to various floors?
• What control is exercised over their use?
• Are the elevators automatic or attended?
• Do the elevators connect operational floors and strictly office floors?
• Does this present a problem in personnel control?
• Are the elevators automatic or attended?
• If automatic, are floor directories posted in them?
• Do avenues within the buildings used for emergency egress pre-
sent a problem of personnel control?
• Examine pedestrian flow from entrance, to locker room, and to work area.
• Can changes be made to shorten routes or improve control of personnel in transit?
• Are personnel using unauthorized entrances and exits?
• If government classified work is being performed, do controls in
use comply with the Defense Department pamphlet for safe-
guarding classified information?
• Are groups authorized to visit and observe operations?
• How are these groups controlled?
• Do registers used to register visitors, vendors, etc. contain ade-
quate information?
• Are these registers regularly inspected? By whom?
• Are employees issued uniforms?
• Are different colors used for different departments?
• What control is exercised over employees during lunch and coffee breaks?
• Do guards or watchmen ever accompany trash trucks or vending
machine servicemen?
• Is parking authorized on premises within the perimeter?
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• Are parking lots fenced off from the production areas?
• What method of control of personnel and vehicles is there in the
parking lots?
• Is vehicle identification used?
• What type of vehicle stickers or identification is used?
• How are issue and receipt of stickers controlled?
• If executives park within the perimeter, are their autos exposed to
employees?
• If nurses and doctors park within the perimeter, are their autos
exposed to employees?
• Where do vendor servicemen park?
• Do vendor servicemen use plant vehicles to make the service
tours? Are small vehicles available?
• How are outside-contractor vehicles controlled?
• What method is used to control shipping and receiving trucks?
• Are the parking facilities adequate at the docks?
• Does parking present a problem in vehicle or personnel control?
• What is the problem encountered?
• During what hour does switching of railroad cars occur?
• Is it possible for persons to enter the premises during switching?
• Are there adequate directional signs to direct persons to specific
activities?
• Are the various buildings and activities adequately marked to
preclude persons from becoming lost?
• Are safety helmets required?
• Are safety shoes required?
• Are safety glasses required?
• Are safety gloves required?
• Are safety aprons required?
• Are full-time nurses or doctors available?
• Is there a vehicle available for emergency evacuation? What type
is it?
IX. Safety for Personnel
• How far away is the nearest hospital in time and distance?
• Are any company employees or guards trained in first aid?
• Is a safety director appointed?
• Is there a safety program? What does it consist of?
• How often does the safety committee meet?
• Is a first aid or medical room available?
• How are medicine cabinets secured?
• Who controls these keys?
• How is the first aid room secured?
• Are any narcotics on hand?
• If so, has narcotics security been established?
• Are the required safety equipment items worn? By visitors?
• What is the safety record of this facility?
• How does it compare with the national record?
• Are areas around machinery well policed?
• Does machinery have installed guards where needed? Are they used?
• Are mirrors used where needed to allow forklift operators to observe "blind" turns?
• Could or would mechanical devices used for forklift control improve safety?
• What type of device could be used? Pneumatic alarm system? Signal light?
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X.  Organization for Emergency
• Are doors adequate in number for speedy evacuation?
• Are they kept clear of obstructions and well marked?
• Are exit aisles clear of obstructions and well marked?
• Are emergency shutdown procedures developed, and is the evacuation plan in writing?
• Do employees understand the plans?
• Are emergency evacuation drills conducted?
• Do guards have specific emergency duties? Do they know these duties?
• Are local police available to assist in emergencies?
• Are any areas of the building in this facility designated as public disaster shelters?
• If so, what control is established to isolate the area from the rest of the facility?
• Do the emergency plans provide for a designated repair crew? Is
the crew adequately equipped and trained?
• Are shelters available and marked for use of employees?
• If the plant is subject to natural disaster phenomena, what are they? Floods? Tornadoes?
• What emergency plans have been formulated to cope with these hazards?
• When and what was the latest incident involving a natural disaster?
• Did it result in loss of life or loss of time?
• Attach a copy of the emergency procedures.
XI. Theft Control
• Are lunchbox inspections conducted?
• Is a package-pass control system being used? Describe it.
• Is a company-employed supervisor assigned to check the package-pass system regularly?
• Is a company official occasionally present during lunchbox inspections?
• Are package passes serially numbered or otherwise containing control numbers?
• Is security of package passes in stock adequate?
• Are comparison signatures available for comparison?
• Is the list of signatures kept up to date?
• What action is taken when anyone is caught stealing?
• What controls are established on tools loaned to employees?
• What controls are established on laundry being removed?
• What is the method of removal of scrap and salvage?
• What controls are exercised over removal of useable scrap?
• Is control of this removal adequate?
• Are vending and service vehicle inspections being conducted?
• Do employees carry lunch boxes to their work areas?
• Are railroad cars inspected entering and leaving the plant?
• Are company-owned delivery or passenger vehicles authorized
to park inside buildings of the plant?
• Does this parking constitute a possible theft problem?
• Do guards check outside the perimeter area for property thrown over fences?
• Do guards occasionally inspect trash pick-up? Does anyone?
XII. Security Guard Forces
• What is present guard coverage—hours per day and total hours per week?
• Describe in detail guard organization and composition.
• Number and times of shifts each twenty-four-hour period during weekdays and weekends?
• Number of stationary posts? When are they manned?
• Number of patrol routes? When and where are they, and when
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are patrols made?
• Are tours supervised by ADT or DETEX stations or both?
• How many stations? Locate them on your plot plan (use different
colours or shapes or symbols for different floors and routes).
• What is length of time of each patrol?
• Is there additional coverage on Saturdays, Sundays, or holidays?
• Do the patrol routes furnish adequate protection as presently established?
• Are the guards required to be deputized?
• Are armed guards required?
• How do guards communicate while on patrol?
• Are written guard instructions available? If so, secure a copy.
• If no written instructions are available, generally describe duties of each shift and post.
• What equipment does the guard force have issued? Need?
• Do they require security clearances? What degree?
• Do they require special training?
• Is there a training program in force?
• What communications are available to the guard force to call outside the facility?
• Is the number of guards, posts/ and patrol routes adequate?
• Are mechanical or electrical devices used in conjunction with the guard force?
• Do the guards know how to operate/ reset/ and monitor the devices properly?
• Do the guards know how to respond when the alarms are activated?
• Are guards included in emergency plans?
• Do guards know their duties? Emergency duties?
• Do guards make written reports of incidents?
• Are adequate records of incidents maintained?
• Are the guards familiar with the use of fire-fighting equipment?
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APPENDIX E:  HERSTRUKTURERING VAN NASPERS IN-HUIS
SEKURITEITS DIENSTE
Memorandum
AAN:   DIE UITVOERENDE KOMITEE
PERSONEELKOMITEE
              VAN:   HE1N BRAND
  DATUM:  1 FEBRUARIE 1999
HERSTRUKTURERING/RASIONALISERING: SEKERHEID
Die notules van die Uitvoerende Komitee van Naspers (25 November 1998), die direksie van
Nasionaie Media Beperk (1 Desember 1998) en die Personeelkomitee van Naspers Beperk (3
Desember 1998) verwys.
Aqterqrond
Beginselgoedkeuring is gegee vir die herstrukturering van sekuriteit in terme waarvan die
bestaande personeel oorgedra word na 'n onafhanklike sekerheidsmaatskappy vanaf Aprii
1998.
Mnre. Brand en Barnard het opdrag ontvang om die herstrukturering te onderhandel met
potensiele diensverskaffers aan die hand van bepaalde riglyne en, tesame daarmee, om 'n
proses van konsultasie met die betrokke personeel te voer. Hiermee die terugvoering wat 'n
aanbeveling behels van hoe die beginselbesluit implementeer kan word.
Stappe geneem
Daar is omvattend onderhande] met 'n aantal potensiele diensverskaffers en skriftelike
voorstelle is ontvang en ontleed, ook wat finansiele implikasies betref.
Wat die personeel betref, is samesprekings gevoer onder toesig van Hennie du Toit van die
Menslike Hulpbronne-afdeling.
 NASPERS
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Carel Barnard het ook wyd konsulteer met die besigheidseenhede in Naspers wat deur die
voorgestelde rasionalisering beinvloed word.
Gevolqtrekkings
In die lig van die voorgenome rasionalisering is daar nou reeds vir 'n geruime tyd nie
permanente aanstellings gemaak in die afdeling: risikobeheer nie, met die effek dat 38 van
die totale personeelkompliment van 146 kontrakwerkers is.
Uit die konsultasies met personeel het dit geblyk dat daar 'n sterk voorkeur is dat die funksie
eerder uitfaseer word deur gewoon nie verdere aanstellings te maak nie en daar was ook
aansienlike weerstand teen die eensklapse verskuif van personeel na buite-instansies se
beheer van die besigheidseenhede (kliente) se kant af.
Vanuit 'n finansiele oogpunt blyk 'n stelselmatige rasionalisering ook die beste opsie te wees.
Die aanbeveling is dus dat die rasionalisering stelselmatig infasseer word aan die hand van
die volgende riglyne:
finaliseer onderhandelinge met personeel in terme waarvan die sekerheidsdienste oor 'n
periode van verkieslik 3 (drie) maar nie meer as 5 (vyf)jaar uitfaseer word
benewens tien persone wat vrywilllig so aangedui het, word geen ander personeel
intussen uitdienstredingspakkette betaal nie. Die koste word beraam op ongeveer R120
000.   Die posisie word eers heroorweeg teen die einde van die proses
alle bestaande kontrakwerkers se kontrakte wat op31 Maart verstryk, word nie hernu
nie-  Carel Barnard-onderhandel met 'n sekerheidsmaatskappy om daardie persone in
diens te neem en te ontplooi in terme van 'n kontrak met Naspers
waar personeei aftree of bedank word hul poste gevries en hulle effektief vervang deur
personeel van 'n sekerheidsmaatskappy.    Naspers behou die reg om inspraak te hê ten
opsigte van die personeel wat sodanige sekerheidsfirma ontplooi op ons persele
die enigste poste wat gevul mag word het betrekking op sekere toesighouers by die
filiale. Daar word voorsien dat daar na afloop van die proses 'n klein "bevelstruktuur" in
Naspers se diens sal wees om te versker dat 'n kwaliteit diens ontvang word
'n bepaling van die subkontrakteringsooreenkomste moet behels dat 'n "perseeltoelaag"
of iets dergliks deur Naspers betaal word om die sekerheids-personeel direk te
subsidieer. Dit word gedoen met die oog daarop om kwaliteit sekerheidspersoneel te
verseker en om die personeel te onderskei van die wat diens lewer aan ander instansies.
Versoek
Dat die Uitvoerende Komitee die voorgestelde herstrukturering van sekerheidsdienste soos
voorheen bespreek, bevestig.     Sodanige herstrukturering vind binne 'n tydsraamwerk van 3
tot 5 jaar plaas aan die hand van kriteria soos bepaal deur die Uitvoerende Komitee soos
hierbo uiteengesit.
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APPENDIX F:  APPROVAL LETTER FOR NASEB SECURITY
PARTNERS
 
Nasionale Media Bpk 
Naspers-Sentrum 
Heerengracht 40 
Kaapstad Posbus2271 
Kaapstad8000 Telefoon: 
(021)406-2409 Faks: 
(021) 406-2457 
 
 
 
 
 
         
NASPERS 
 
 
National Media Ltd 
Naspers Centre 40 
Heerengracht Cape Town  
Box 2271 Cape Town 
800) Telephone (021) 
406-2409 Fax: (021) 406-
2457 
11 Maart 1999 
HEIL DE LESER 
Hiermee bevestig ek dat ASAP A mnre G Ie Roux en B de Villiers se tender 
aanvaar word vir sekerheidsdienste vanaf 1 April 1999 vir Naspers. 
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